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ABSTRACT
From its origins in 1944 the World Bank has been one of the foremost agents of
sustainable growth throughout the developing world. Increasingly the Bank has been very
active combating poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, historically one of the world’s poorest
regions. This study focuses on the World Bank rather than the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) because the Bank is the driving force of development in Africa. Although the
Bank is a major actor in the socio-economic landscape of southern Africa (Botswana,
Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and
Lesotho), there have been few qualitative studies done, examining the Banks
effectiveness in Lesotho. The following questions will guide my research analysis with
regards to the Bank and the developmental relationship it has with Lesotho. My research
questions are: has the Bank been effective in fulfilling its stated health care
developmental objectives as outlined in the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan? If so,
how has it been effective? If not, what can be done to make it more effective? Does the
Bank recognise the importance of local developmental goals? This study proposes to use
qualitative methods to assess the effectiveness of the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action
Plan, focusing specifically on the health sector as a component of the PRP.
Approximately three months were spent in the field conducting research primarily
through interviews and through the use of indigenous sources. Interviews will be
conducted with those (i.e. doctors, health professionals) directly affected or influenced by
the Banks efforts to reduce poverty. Following research in the field, if need be, this paper
will attempt to suggest alternative methods to enhance the overall effectiveness of the
Banks policy implementation. This study was also undertaken with the intention of
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testing whether the coordination and implementation of aid were major determinants of
the general effectiveness of aid. Moreover, on a macro level, the results of this analysis
should support theories posited by other notable scholars on the subject of developmental
aid and its effectiveness.
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I. THEORIZING POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAMMES
What is development? For many academics this question can be answered in numerous
ways: capitalists would argue that development should promote evolutionary change and
economic growth, while socialists would argue that development should focus on
‘promoting’ basic human needs, Marxists on the other hand look at development as
fundamentally promoting a classless society bent on revolutionary change. An
appropriate theory on development has no concrete meaning, no widely accepted
definition, in essence development can mean whatever one needs it to mean.
Development can be viewed through numerous lenses: academics view development
through different disciplines, professions and perspectives. Despite all these different
lenses, the notion of poverty reduction however one chooses to define it, can easily fall
under the broader definition of development.
The international financial institutions that dominate the contemporary socio
economic landscape do a lot of good under the blanket term of development. With this
comes the idea the development is inherently a good thing, or a positive step in the right
direction: assisting those primarily in the developing world in a progression towards a
universal “good.” Even this idea of a universal “good” is subjective to those in different
parts of the world. For example what is good for a multinational corporation may not be
good for a village chief in Zimbabwe. However using the premise that development is
inherently positive, the overall promotion of development in the developing world has
grown over the last few years.
To give this notion of development a more indigenous feel: James Ferguson in his
1994 text The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development, ” Depoliticization and Bureaucratic
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Power in Lesotho highlights the conceptual inconsistencies in defining ‘development.’
Ferguson argues that there are two notions of development, the first, relates development
to the ‘forces of production,’ that is the concept of development as a progression towards
modem capitalism. The second notion of development that Ferguson reviews is a more
contemporary outlook on development, development as poverty alleviation, or improving
the quality of life.
E. Stewart notes “the very notion of ‘development’ in fact, presupposes a
commitment to materialism, change, progress, and science, which are basically Western
values.”1Development in this sense becomes a means to an end; a means to achieving a
Western-type growth both economically and socially; it is also interesting to note that the
term ‘development’ is commonly associated with the developing world. Very rarely does
one hear of ‘development models’ being applied to the United States, Canada or the
European Union, because by modem standards they have fully developed, they are part
of the ‘North’ and the developing world is part of the ‘South.’ The ‘North’ referring to
countries located primarily in the northern hemisphere that “tend to be more
economically advanced than their southern counterparts.”2
No discussion of development is complete without examining the contradictions
that the term presents. Historically development has been a battle between two rationales,
tradition and modernity: with “tradition” in the developing world being the problem or an
obstacle to development: conversely “modernization” through agents of the West being
the solution. The theories are numerous, all battling to weigh the pros and cons of
tradition versus modernization against each other, but where academics come to a general
1 Allen Merriam, “What does ‘Third World’ mean?” The Third World. States o f Mind and Being. (Boston:
Unwin Hyman), 16.
2 Merriam, 18.
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consensus is that traditionally development was and continues to be a top-down process.
What this means is that the decision making process is controlled by the International
Financial Institutions, which are predominantly located in the West, examples of major
institutions include the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (WB).
The top-down approach to development uses the assumption that foreign aid,
through these institutions, will ‘trickle down’ and serve the greater population in a
positive manner. Positive in the sense of increased returns to the aid or productivity,
because in the majority of situations foreign aid is given a monetary value, and the best
way to measure monetary value is through productivity. All things said, the coordination
between these institutions and the governments receiving this aid determines the extent to
which this aid is effective. Poor coordination in even the most promising situation can
and most likely will lead to failure.
The opposite approach to top-down development is the bottom-up approach to
development. This approach calls for primarily “attention to health and education, but
also to more effectively locally based problem solving techniques.”3 Attention is paid to
health and education because one would imagine that they contribute substantially to the
overall notion of community development through the notion of self-help. In this
situation, the role of the institutions is that of a catalyst in promoting self-sufficiency
rather than that of a decision maker. In the contemporary world Non-Governmental
Organizations dominate the institutions that use this approach.
Two things become apparent here. Firstly, when conceptualising development for
a study of foreign aid and its effectiveness, development can be anything that promotes

3 Jan Black, Development in Theory and Practice: Paradigms and Paradoxes 2nd Ed (Colorado: Westview
Press, 1999), 21.
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the idea of progression. Secondly, the primary agent of development in the developing
world is the state. Be it the state working along side bilateral and multilateral agents, be it
the state working with individual entrepreneurs in a free market society, be it the state
working with the public sector or be it the state working on its own in a highly
centralized economy, the state is the fundamental agent of development.
For the purposes of this analysis, ‘development’ shall be defined in accordance
with Ferguson’s second notion of development:
Development is taken to mean improvement in quality o f
life or standard o f living, and the elimination or alleviation
o f poverty.4

This definition was chosen primarily because it is more ‘in line’ with the stated goals and
objectives o f the major international institutions. For example, the World Bank states that
its mandate is to “reduce poverty and improve living standards through sustainable
growth and investment in people.”5 This definition also embodies a certain degree of
totality to it, totality in a humanitarian socio-economic way. Any attempt to come to a
conclusive definition of development is handicapped by competing and contradicting
theorists and scholars. One feels that the definition offered by Ferguson presupposes
nothing. In other words the definition offered, while signifying a progression can be
applied to the developed world and the developing world, and still retains the same
meaning. Other notions o f development assume some sort of movement or modernization
to the West, when really what developing countries need is not to be modernized along
Western tenets but developed to ensure sustainability.

4 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development.” Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in
Lesotho (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1994), 55.
5 World Bank, “The World Bank’s Mission.” Feb 17. Online.
http://www.worldbank.org/povertv/mission/index.htm
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The argument in brief then is the following: the World Bank as the foremost
agent of development has over the last decade been very active in combating poverty
around the globe, specifically in the more under-developed areas of the world, i.e. subSaharan Africa. The Bank has committed foreign aid both financially and technically to
reducing poverty in the Kingdom of Lesotho through various projects and initiatives. One
of these initiatives the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PRP), provided a
comprehensive review of poverty in Lesotho, and made policy recommendations: one of
them being investment in human resources as a means to poverty reduction.
Investment in human resources can come in many forms, encompassing various
socio-economic sectors. This study will focus on the investments made in the health
sector as a component of the PRP, in the process assessing whether or not the project was
successful in fulfilling its stated objectives. The question of foreign aid and its
effectiveness will bring into play two other factors that exist in the relationship between
donor and recipient, namely coordination and implementation. The short answer to the
question of the significance of coordination is found on two levels. Coordination between
the Bank and the government and coordination between government (as the principal
agent of development) and the health care professionals is inadequate. Theoretically
while implementation of policies is a responsibility of government, good coordination
leads to better communication which enhances implementation. Therefore, simply put, if
the Bank and the government are not on the “same page” so to speak when it comes to
the implementation of proposed policies, nothing concrete can be achieved. As this study
will ultimately illustrate, both coordination and implementation are crucial to the
effectiveness o f foreign aid, particularly in a country like Lesotho.
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The methodology for this study is fairly simple. It will be a qualitative study, with
the primary mode of research being interviews, those interviewed will be health
professionals and health administrators in Lesotho. The results of these interviews will be
consolidated and contrasted against the stated goals of the 1995 PRP.
With the amount of theorizing that there is in the development world,
there seems to be an inherent trend in development circles to separate the ‘reality’ of
development (extreme poverty) from the theory and practice of development assistance
through foreign aid. However, when all is said and done, foreign aid cannot be separated
categorically; the reality, theory and practice of foreign aid should be embodied in one
concept of development, in which we assume that countries of the periphery, including
newly industrialized countries have a problem (i.e. economic stagnation) and that they are
the problem (i.e. political problems); foreign aid will likely succeed if it is taken in its
totality and applied consciously, through adequate channels and proper coordination. For
the purposes of this paper it should be noted that the primary objective is to examine the
effectiveness of project specific aid and not ‘national’ or country specific aid.
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INTRODUCTION
Just as defining development should include a certain degree of totality, it is essential for
this study to outline the perceived role of the World Bank, and what this role signifies in
its relationship with Lesotho. By providing a theoretical overview of the Bank, the
‘foreign aid regime,’ democracy and Lesotho this chapter will show that the current
socio-economic and political path of development that Lesotho is on, combined with
Lesotho’s unfortunate position of being a small, landlocked and economically weak
country has throughout time increased its dependency on developmental aid. This
dependency has manifested itself into an intensification of what can essentially be called
a patron-client relationship.
Quite often the relationship between international institution and ‘developing’
country develops into a patron-client relationship: defined as an arrangement between an
individual who has authority, social status, wealth, or some other personal resource (the
patron) and another person who benefits from his or her support or influence (the client).6
When looking at the developmental relationship that exists between the Bank and
Lesotho it is clear to see that the World Bank is the patron and Lesotho is the client.
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the original
institution o f what is now the World Bank (WB) was founded at the Bretton Woods
conference in 1944. Initially the Bank’s function was to provide funds for the post-World
War II reconstruction of Europe: it is in this era that the acceptance of aid as an
irreplaceable component of the contemporary world economy began. In 1960, the
International Development Association (IDA) was created to loan money to developing

6 Hyper Dictionary. “Patron Client Relationship Definition.” 2 Nov 2003. Online. Available from
http://www.hvperdictionarv.com/dictionarv/patron+client+relationship
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countries, it is with the introduction of the IDA, that the Bank began moving rapidly
“from postwar reconstruction to economic development, and by the end of the decade the
shift was complete.”7 As time went on, the Bank evolved into distributing long terms
loans for development, these loans often required no payment for at least ten years.
Today’s Bank is comprised of five separate economic entities: the IBRD, the IDA, the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the International
Q

Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),
collectively known as the World Bank Group. However in the context of foreign aid, IFC
and MIGA are not considered as aid institutions.
The World Bank Group’s current stated mandate is to fight poverty and improve
the living standards o f people in the developing world. A key component of this mandate
is that the Bank works with partners in an attempt to reduce poverty: these partners tend
to be governments and other international aid agencies or institutions. Recently the Bank
and other multilateral and bilateral institutions developed the Millennium Development
Goals, designed specifically to combat poverty globally. The Bank primarily acts as a
developmental bank that provides developing countries with technical assistance,
developmental loans and policy advice.9
From an administrative standpoint, the Bank raises funds by borrowing from the
international capital market, the Bank then issues bonds, which are a very safe investment
as they have the highest bond rating (AAA).10 Additional capital is derived from member

7 Mike Mason, Development and Disorder: A History o f the Third World since 1945 (Toronto: Between
The Lines, 1997), 424.
8 World Bank, World Bank History. Accessed 28 October 2003; available from
http:// web.worldbank.org/wbsite/extemal/extaboutus/extarchives
9 World Bank. “World Bank Homepage.” 28 October 2003. Online. Available from www.worldbank.org
10 The Asia Development Bank, Africa Development Bank and Caribbean Development Bank also have
(AAA) bonds.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

9

countries subscriptions in capital shares. The Bank is governed by a board of governors
comprising representatives from each member country. As previously noted, the
introduction of the Millennium Development Goals has led to the Bank strengthening its
focus on poverty reduction as the overall objective of all its work. This could not have
come at a better time, current poverty trends predict that by 2015, 345 million people in
sub-Saharan Africa will earn under $1 per day.11
The aid regime is better understood as a facet
o f the trade practices o f the dominant economies
that have guaranteed the subordination o f many
economies o f the third world.12

The idea of foreign aid as a means to development took flight in the post-war era.
The American generated Marshall Plan contributed approximately $13 billion13 to the
reconstruction of Europe over four years. In the developing world the foreign aid regime
flourished on two distinct levels: aid was used to either destroy independence movements
through the promotion of ‘democracy’ (Malaysia and Indochina) or as a “hammerlock to
hold Third World countries in place as dependent associates in a U.S. - dominated
system.” 14 By U.S. dominance Mason is referring to the fact that the IMF and World
Bank were at the time dominated ideologically by the United States.
Therefore the view that a foreign aid regime can create a dependency and evolve
into a patron-client relationship is founded on the principle belief that habitual aid was a
vehicle for the promotion of Western interests. The literature review provides more
concrete exam ples o f foreign aid and its effectiveness; how ever one feels that it is

necessary to briefly explore the tensions that exist between development and democracy
11 Jehan Arulpragasam and Giovanna Prennushi, Poverty Reduction and the World Bank: Progress in
Operationalizing the WDR 2000/2001 (Washington D.C: Library o f Congress, 2002), 12.
12 Mason, 432.
13 Mason, 433.
14 Mason, 433.
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as it relates to the effectiveness of foreign aid: more specifically the tension that exists
between western notions of development and democracy and ‘Africanized’ versions of
development and democracy.
Using western lenses, the ‘strengthening’ or promotion of democracy in the
developing world has historically been seen as the strengthening of civil society, and the
effect that this has on the developmental process. Freer civil society equals more civil
liberties. In an African context, Harold Fisher stresses the importance of the ‘citizen,’
noting that “the citizen must come to feel that he or she has an important role in society
and can take part in governance in some way.”15 For project and policy effectiveness, it is
important that an institution like the Bank has a good working relationship with NonGovernmental Organizations and other such actors because this can to a certain extent
determine the path of development for national civil societies: which the west uses as a
measuring stick for democracy. When exploring the relationship between democracy and
economic liberalization (another way o f defining development), using international
financial institutions as a backdrop, it is essential to recognise the relationship or lack of a
relationship between foreign aid and democracy: foreign aid in this context being the
means towards economic liberalization.
Following the independence movements in Africa and Latin America in the
1960’s and 1970’s the worlds multilateral and bilateral institutions have increasingly
included the promotion of democracy as a major focus of their developmental goals
(often as part o f conditionality attached to loans). The ideology of certain African
countries post independence tended to be more Socialist (Zimbabwe, Central African

15 Harold Fisher, Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Problems. Advances, and Prospects (London:
Greenwood Press, 2001), 122.
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Republic and Ghana to name a few) and Marxist (Tanzania, Benin and Angola). For the
majority of these African countries that sought aid following independence, a move to
capitalism and democracy was required: closer relations with the west would
undoubtedly lead to increased foreign investment and economic liberalization. Therefore
the donor - recipient relationship comes into play, especially when dealing with foreign
aid. When examining this relationship, different ‘developmental’ trajectories are
influenced by levels of clientelism, tribalism and clan-politics.
Essentially what all this background information on aid, democracy and the
World Bank does is provide a springboard to leap into the history of foreign aid in
Lesotho. Foreign aid has played a very important role in the development of Lesotho,
partly because the socio-economic conditions that have led to Lesotho being labelled a
“developmental challenge” by the World Bank, have persisted following its
independence.
The Kingdom of Lesotho is a small, overpopulated, landlocked country in
southern Africa completely surrounded by South Africa. Lesotho currently has a
population of 1.8 million and an area of approximately 30, 000 square kilometres.16 It is
desperately short of economic resources, and traditional rural activities dominate
providing income for approximately 85 percent of the population.

17

To say Lesotho is a

very poor country, is an understatement. In 2000 the gross national product (GNP) per
capita was $540, approximately eighty percent of Lesotho’s population lives in rural,
mountainous areas. As previously mentioned earlier, Lesotho’s economy is “based on

16 CIA: The World Fact Book, “Lesotho.” 4 Nov 2003. Online. Available from
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/lt.html
17 World Bank, Lesotho: A Developmental Challenge (Washington DC: Library o f Congress, 1975), 1.
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limited agricultural and pastoral production,”18 and is completely economically
dependant on South Africa. Lesotho became a member of the Bank in 1968 and to date
the Bank has assisted Lesotho with numerous projects, including projects in: agriculture,
transportation, education, health and community development. The first Bank initiative
was a transportation project in 1966, with the most recent being a health sector reform
initiative started in 2002.19
The importance o f colonialism in Lesotho’s developmental history can not be
underestimated. Lesotho gained independence from the British in 1966 and “became an
independent constitutional monarchy”20 that same year. Briefly, Lesotho is a
constitutional monarchy, one of only three monarchies in Africa. The bi-cameral multi
party Parliament consists of a National Assembly, whose 120 Members are elected by
universal suffrage, and a Senate comprising 22 principal chiefs and 11 other persons
nominated by the King.21 As from the most recent general election, in May 2002,
Members of the National Assembly are elected under a proportional system combining
80 members elected to individual constituencies on a first-past-the post system and 40
members elected according to the share of the national vote gained by each party.
Lesotho inherited no economic or political infrastructure to speak of: this
is primarily because the British government did not introduce any modem forms of
development, expecting that Lesotho, at some stage would be incorporated into South
Africa, and assuming that it would more or less be automatically developed as an indirect

18 Fareed Hassan, Lesotho: Development in a Challenging Environment. (Washington: The International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2002), 2.
19 World Bank. “Lesotho Country Information.” 2 Nov 2003. Online. Available from
www. worldbank. or g/afr/ls2 .htm
20 Hassan, 1.
21 World Bank. “Lesotho Country Information.” 2 Nov 2003. Online. Available from
www.worldbank.org/aff/ls2.htm
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effect of the strong expansionary forces in South Africa. As a result, institutional capacity
was not developed. In a direct attempt to encourage economic development, the British,
in 1966 sent a mission, better known as the ‘Porter Mission’ to Lesotho to determine
external assistance needs for more vigorous socioeconomic development.22 P. Welling
notes that between 1966 and 1967 total British aid to Lesotho rose to a peak of R8.6
million.23 Thus, one can see that as early as 1966, there was this immediate reliance or
dependence on outside actors to provide economic assistance.
Before one delves into the intricacies of Lesotho’s foreign aid, it is important to
note that not all of the Bank’s developmental aid to Lesotho is financial. The majority of
the Bank’s aid to Lesotho is and continues to be knowledge based; by this one refers to
aid in the form of analytical and technical assistance through such task forces as the
Strategic Economic Options Report (SEOR). The SEOR for example was responsible for
compiling data on several sectors (including health) and “played a part in the World
Bank’s dialogue with the government on development priorities.”24 It was through the
SEOR that the 1994 Country Assessment (CAS) was formulated, which led to the 1995
Poverty Reduction Action Plan. It should be noted that how a country is assessed is
determined by external formulations.
Khabele Matlotsa notes that aid is one of the most valuable external resources for
landlocked and resource poor Lesotho.25 The question that needs to be asked here is why
is aid such a valuable commodity to Lesotho? Granted Lesotho has no vast reserves of

22 World Bank, 3.
23 P. Wellings, “Aid to the Southern African Periphery: The Case Lesotho,” Applied Geography vol. 2,
1982, 7.
24 Hassan, 11.
25

Khabele Matlotsa, “Aid, Development and Democracy in Lesotho,” Southern African Regional Institute
for Policy Studies (SARIPS), Zimbabwe, 1999.
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mineral wealth but the country has been and continues to be in an economic relationship
with South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland (The South African Customs
Union, SACU), and through SACU, Lesotho enjoys the benefits of shared revenues and
preferential access to South African markets, particularly in agriculture. Therefore critics
argue, why such a large dependency on foreign aid?
The evolution of the aid regime in Lesotho began post-independence. There is an
important historical aspect underlying the evolution of this aid regime, but for the
purposes of this introduction a brief summary should serve as the foundation to explain
the emergence o f the patron-client relationship between the Bank and Lesotho. Lesotho’s
aid sources multiplied in the 1970’s as direct a result of the political climate of the then
apartheid South Africa: the international community felt sympathy for this country
surrounded by South Africa:26 and consequently sought to assist through economic and
developmental aid.
James Ferguson in his excellent account of development and politicization in
Lesotho notes that between 1975-1984 Lesotho was receiving developmental assistance
from several bilateral sources including; Australia, Canada, Korea, Iran, Norway, United
Kingdom and the United States. However during this same time period, Lesotho was also
receiving aid from several multilateral institutions, including several non and quasigovemmental organizations.27
The second evolution of the aid regime occurred in 1986 following the military
coup, which saw a military junta replace a civilian government. This had a significant

26 Lesotho used the 1976 Soweto uprising to acquire more external assistance, due to the fact that many
South Africans were fleeing their country to go to Lesotho.
27 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: Development. Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in
Lesotho. (London: University o f Minnesota Press, 1994), 6.
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effect on aid flows to the country. The military coup coincided with the distinct push of
structural adjustment loans by the Bank, as a result donors began to emphasise
implementation of economic liberalisation and economic pluralism. Ultimately the
military regime succumbed to donor pressure by withdrawing from political power in
1993: so the influence o f donors led to the re-institutionalisation of democratic rule.

98

.

Aid

in the 1990’s was delivered by the Bank in an uncertain political climate, and some critics
argue that this weakened the effectiveness of assistance programs.
Historically aid has played an important role in the development of Lesotho. Over
the last thirty years, the Bank has completed 28 projects in Lesotho, and as of 2003 there
are currently 21 active projects.29 This is fairly significant in a country that is slightly
smaller than the state of Maryland. With all this aid flowing into Lesotho, one recalls a
theory introduced by Milton Friedman who essentially believes that too much aid leads to
negative economic growth, and is therefore counterproductive. Over the last thirty years,
the Bank has contributed approximately $448 million for the 28 projects, of which $78
million has gone towards education; $178 million has gone towards water sanitation, $36
million to urban development and $15.6 towards health and nutrition.30
Exploring this notion of a patron client relationship further: to exist there has to be
an unequal relationship, be it economic, social or political between patron and client.
James C. Scott argues that there has to be an imbalance in exchange between two
‘trading’ partners, this imbalance reflecting the disparity in their relative wealth.

1

The

28 Matlotsa, 3.
29 World Bank. “Lesotho Country Information.” 2 Nov 2003. Online. Available from
www.worldbank.org/aff/ls2.htm
30 Hassan, 21.
31 James Scott, “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,” American Political Science
Review LXVI, no. 1 (1972) :93.
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World Bank has for the current year (2003) provided $18.5 billion in developmental
assistance worldwide. In direct contrast, Lesotho’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for
2002 was $2, 700 and 49% of the country lives under the poverty line:32 the poverty line
being those living on less than $1 a day. Over the last five years (1998-2003) Lesotho has
received $85 million in official developmental assistance from the Bank. There is an
obvious disparity in the relative wealth of the World Bank and Lesotho.
A patron according to Scott is one who operates with the resources that are
available to them. The Bank raises almost all its money from the financial markets, in
2002 it managed to raise $23 billion, thus it has a considerable amount of resources
available to it at any given time. The Bank theoretically is able to use these resources
over time to perpetuate the existing patron client relationship with Lesotho. It has already
been established that Lesotho as the ‘client’ has no substantial resources of any kind that
would allow the country to remove itself from this relationship. In fact one could argue
that there are incentives for Lesotho to remain in this relationship, without assistance
from the Bank, the existing infrastructure in Lesotho at least theoretically would not be
able to cope economically or socially.
Over time the relationship between the World Bank and Lesotho has evolved into
a delicate patron-client relationship, with both sides benefiting from the relationship.
More precisely, by establishing clientage relations, the Bank (as the patron) has been able
to secure a readily available, trustworthy recipient country, which enables the Bank to
economize by giving out loans: economize through the notion of conditionality,
conditions attached to loans. The idea of conditionality is discussed further in the

32 CIA: The World Fact Book, “Lesotho.” 4 Nov 2003. Online. Available from
http://www.cia.gov/cia/Dublications/factbook/geos/lt.html
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literature review with regards to aid effectiveness. Joseph Stiglitz notes that
conditionality almost always ensures that loans are repaid, but quite often conditionality
-1 -5

turns the loan into a policy tool.

So the question then becomes can policy tools be used

for perhaps promoting the tenets of Western ideology, namely market liberalization and
democracy? As for the client (Lesotho), by entering into such a relationship, Lesotho
obtains guaranteed access to economic and social aid or other various kinds of flexible
assistance provided by the Bank. This relationship has developed because both sides have
consistently gained what they want.
The intensification o f this relationship can be examined according to total external
debt owed to the World Bank by Lesotho. Currently Lesotho owes the Bank $638
million34, however over the last twenty year period, Lesotho’s total external debt to all
multilateral and bilateral institutions was: $8.2 million (1973), $34 million (1979), $128
million (1983), $512 million (1993) and $712 million (1999).35 Of the $712 million
owed, approximately $185 million is owed to IDA, and $56 million to the IBRD.
Therefore, it can clearly be seen that there has been a gradual increase in Lesotho’s
external debt over the last twenty years. Naturally as the debt increases, the patron has
more incentive to loan more and the client has more incentive to seek further assistance
in an attempt to alleviate the burden of the debt.
The foreseeable future looks relatively bleak if one considers that southern Africa
over the last two years has experienced massive drought and famine. This has serious
implications for a country like Lesotho whose rural community relies heavily on

33 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents. (New York: Norton Paperback, 2002), 44.
34 World Bank Document. “Lesotho at a Glance.” 2 Nov 2003. Online. Available from
http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrvdata/aag/lso aag.pdf
35 World Bank, World Tables 1995. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 418.
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agriculture for subsistence. With food shortages a likely outcome, this will only serve to
intensify the existing patron client relationship. Lesotho has received $41 million in food
aid over the last year to serve an estimated 500, 000 people.36 Food shortages lead to
greater health issues, which in-tum strain the existing health infrastructure. In Lesotho
there are only a handful major hospitals, the most prominent being the district hospital
Queen Elizabeth II hospital, located in the capital Maseru. There are others i.e. Leribe
trauma unit and Mohale’s Hoek district hospital to name a few.
Lesotho’s current developmental path will increase its dependency on aid, while
at the same time negating the effectiveness of this aid, although with a little internal ‘fine
tuning’ by the Bank, aid could potentially have a greater effect. While Lesotho receives a
significant amount of aid, inefficient government bureaucracy (lack of coordination and
implementation) and limited absorptive capacity for foreign assistance impede Lesotho’s
efforts to sustain long terms growth and reduce poverty. This is not a measure of the aid,
but it is a measure of effectiveness of the aid. Ineffective aid perpetuates patron client
relationships, because where aid fails, more developmental aid is borrowed to ‘make up’
for that lost aid.
As previously mentioned the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PRP) was part
of the Strategic Economic Options Report (SEOR) employed by the Bank; in this case the
PRP was a joint project between the Lesotho government, the Lesotho Council of Non
Governmental Organizations, the European Union, USAID and the World Bank. The
PRP was designed to be a medium term (1995-2000) strategy with the World Bank
providing most of the technical, financial, analytical expertise that went into the PRP.

36 BBC News. “Food Aid reaches famine hit Swaziland.” 3 Nov 2003. Online. Available from
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/africa/21711 56.stm
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The emphasis of this particular PRP was on poverty reduction through private sector
development, “improved social services and human resources.”37 This paper will examine
the investments made in human resources, particularly in health care, by the World Bank
and determine whether or not they were successful in meeting their stated goals. Briefly,
the following were the four domestic goals set for health care through the 1995 PRP:
• Exempt children less than five from health fees
• Introduce a free basic health service
• Increase geographic equity
• Allow local facilities to retain certain fe e s 38

In light of this my research questions are: has the World Bank been effective in
fulfilling its developmental objectives stated in the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan?
By developmental objectives I refer to “characteristics” associated with the
implementation of an effective health care administrative system; it should be noted that
this not only involves the Bank, but the government of Lesotho. If so, how has it been
effective? If not, what can be done to make it more effective? And lastly, does the Bank
recognise the importance of the local developmental goals outlined in the PRP?
Understanding indigenous developmental objectives is crucial with regards to
development in the health sector. Numerous examples illustrate how potential
development schemes have failed because often donor and recipient country are not on
the ‘same page’ when it comes to attainable objectives. The most notable example here
comes in the form of Rwanda. In 1993 the French sold military arms to Rwanda which
were subsequently used in the genocide in 1994. The irony here is that the French then
sent medical aid, in the form of doctors and soldiers to protect those being annihilated.39

37 Hassan, 12.
38 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan taken from Table 3.1, Hassan, 12.
39 Mason, 435.
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As Lesotho and the Bank embrace globalization, that is, trans-national economic
transactions and a more enhanced global awareness off poverty, Lesotho’s dependency
on foreign donors such as the World Bank is bound to increase. This causal relationship
between Lesotho and the World Bank provides the perfect contextual back drop to
outline the parameters of aid effectiveness as it relates to this study. Before one does that,
it is important to define several key terms.
For the purposes of this analysis poverty reduction shall be defined strictly as: a
significant improvement, over time, in the sustainability o f the health care system. In light
of this, one can ask the question can effectiveness be measured by the final outcome of a
policy as it relates to health care. Or should effectiveness be a manifestation of a
combination o f economic and social attributes? Effectiveness can very easily be
measured by macroeconomic variables, levels of rural development, levels of human
capital development and by levels of private sector development: but effectiveness in this
case is being measured as strengthening the long term ability o f human resources: that is,
the extent to which the health care system has evolved and is relatively free o f social and
economic restraints. Key to this definition is the notion of long term as opposed to short
term, when thinking of development, the emphasis should be on long term improvements
and methods by which to sustain these improvements.
This is the most viable way of measuring a term that forms the backbone of this
analysis because, as the literature review will show, effectiveness is dependant and can be
defined based on a number of factors, and in order to minimise the discrepancies between
the different factors it is necessary to consolidate characteristics of each factor into one
working definition. In attempting to reach a conclusive definition of effectiveness it is
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inevitable that there will be large methodological pitfalls associated with this process.
However the current definition serves both micro (poverty alleviation) and macro
(economic growth) needs of development. Lastly, this study will not distinguish between
forms of Bank developmental aid: policy, project and sector aid will be brought under the
blanket terms ‘project’ or ‘project aid.’
The notion of poverty reduction is inherently a very misleading term. The Bank
and other such International Financial Institutions like to define poverty as living on less
than $1 a day. Michel Chossudovsky makes us aware that the Bank’s “one-dollar-a-day
criterion applies only to developing countries,”40 and along similar lines he asks what
about those people who live on less than $3 a day? Does that make them not poor?
The one-dollar-a-day standard has no rational
basis: population groups in developing countries
with per capita incomes o f two, three, or even five
dollars remain poverty stricken (i.e., unable to
meet basic expenditures on food, clothing, shelter,
health and education).41

Quite often, particularly in the third world poverty reduction is measured by
looking at the development of infrastructure i.e. buildings for schools or furnishing
classrooms. However, will simply having more infrastructure alleviate poverty? It’s
almost absurd to think that building three buildings in rural Lesotho will eradicate the
poverty that exists there. Instead poverty reduction efforts should start from the bottom
and work up. For example if the Bank and other such organizations want to alleviate
poverty, then (especially in the context o f Africa) they should focus on educating the

women.

40 Michel Chossudovsky, “Global Poverty in the Late 20lh Century.” Journal o f International Affairs 52.
no.l (1998): 300.
41 Chossudovsky, 296.
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This focus on women would be warranted primarily because in the ‘third world’
women are often seen as the backbone of long term development, particularly in Lesotho
where there is this notion of the “gold widows:” ‘gold widows’ being Basotho women
who are abandoned by their husbands who travel to South Africa to seek employment and
a better wage in the various South African mines. As a result of this the women are left to
bear the brunt of all the domestic chores. Grassroots education of the women will in the
long run yield a greater return to investment that merely building schools and providing
teachers.
This said, the health care system is a solid representation of the level of
development a country has sustained. The health care system encompasses both social
and economic factors, for example: access and equality (social) and cost (economic). The
decision to focus on the health care system in Lesotho as a measure of aid effectiveness is
therefore two-fold. First and foremost there are hardly a limited number of partners
involved in financing the health sector in Lesotho. The Ministry of Health and Social
Welfare works primarily with the Ireland Aid, Africa Development Bank and the World
Bank to finance its projects.42 Secondly, upon examining the levels of aid that has gone to
Lesotho, the health sector received only 3.5% of World Bank sectoral lending, which
translates to US$15.6 million between 1966 and 1999: and the Bank readily admits that it
“did not provide much relevant assistance in the health sector during the early 1990’s.”43

42 World Bank Project Information Document AB 277, 1.
43 Hassan, 29.
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II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The complex nature of social and economic change means that the impact of foreign aid
cannot easily be separated from other interrelated factors. With this notion, the literature
review will focus on scholarly literature regarding the general effectiveness of aid and
World Bank aid, and in this regard will also analyse what is ‘considered’ to be effective.
By aid, one does not solely mean capital, indeed aid (as previously stated) includes
generating knowledge which can be utilised in the development process. In order to not
be too reliant on World Bank resources for information, this review will balance Bank
literature with other independent entities, be it independent authors or institutions. From
an organizational standpoint, following a brief introduction this literature review will be
divided into six sections. The first five sections will discuss the conditions that contribute
to effective aid development as outlined by academics within the development field,
namely: ownership, good policy environment in the recipient nation, fungibility,
conditionality and institutional capacity.
It is imperative to note that, apart from the World Bank’s 1975 and 2002 studies,
Lesotho: a Developmental Challenge and Lesotho: Development in a Challenging
Environment, there is no concrete body of scholarly research on Lesotho and the effects
of developmental aid. The challenge with constructing a scholarly literature review on the
World Bank’s developmental objectives in Lesotho is perhaps best understood by James
Ferguson, who in his 1994 study of rural development in Lesotho: The Anti-Politics
Machine: “Development, ” Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho, ” argues
that development institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Overseas
Development Institution (UK) and other such institutions) spawn their own type of
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developmental “discourse,” and this “discourse simultaneously constructs Lesotho as a
particular kind of object, and subsequently creates a structure of knowledge around that
object,”44 in this case the type of knowledge being development oriented. As a side bar,
development for this study has already been conceptualised as the improvement in quality
of life or standard of living, and the elimination or alleviation of poverty. Hence the need
to balance the literature review with Bank literature and independent literature, because
to rely solely on World Bank literature would not be an accurate representation of foreign
aid in the developing world.
One o f the prominent themes in the paper is that the degree of coordination
between the Bank and ‘third world’ (in this case, the government of Lesotho) is a very
important determinant of aid success. Along with this, the coordination between local
government and other agents of development is also a very important determinant of aid
effectiveness. In the context of foreign aid and poverty reduction, the following chapter
will also briefly address scholarly literature on the role of the African elite in promoting
development. The inclusion of literature on elites may seem out of sorts, but in the
context of development, elites have played and continue to play significant roles in nation
and capacity building45 throughout the ‘developing’ world. Indeed “when donor financed
projects fail it is often because of weak institutions and public organizations,”46 which is
a direct reflection on the role of the elite, who are often the ones responsible for
implementing the projects, and are often those that formulate domestic policy.

44 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development.” Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in
Lesotho (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1994), xiv.
45 Capacity building in this situation defined as strengthening the ability o f institutions to improve their
overall performance.
45 World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works. What Doesn’t and Why (Washington DC: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 89.
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From a theoretical perspective numerous studies have documented the role and
effectiveness of the World Banks aid, although as previously mentioned none have
focused specifically on Lesotho. Notably the World Bank itself publishes yearly
summaries of its operations around the world (World Development Reports and Country
Assessment Strategies (CAS)). The Operations Evaluations Department (OED) also
evaluates projects for the World Bank. The OED is an independent entity which reports
directly to the Banks governing body (as opposed to the president). For example in a
1989 Bank report, the OED concluded that 81% of all evaluated projects are performing
satisfactorily, with an average economic return of 16%.47
More specifically, it is common for Bank projects in infrastructure to do much
better than say projects in health and agriculture, as Cassen notes these results are fairly
similar to other aid agencies who find that approximately two thirds of their projects
produce satisfactory results.48 One of the foremost critiques of ‘in-house’ reviews by the
Bank is that these evaluations tend to be self-serving, promoting the Bank as this
‘unflawed entity.’ The Bank, to their credit, has gone to a significant amount of effort to
ensure that this does not happen, by being more accountable for their project successes or
failures.
The literature on the effectiveness of aid is replete with numerous studies (Baker,
Burnside, Buckley and Killick to name a few) linking aid with several macro economic
variables, such as economic growth, investment, taxation and other outcomes such as
poverty.49 Luttik and White highlight one of the fundamental problems in constructing a

47 Tony Killick, “Developmental Effectiveness o f Aid to Africa,” World Bank Working Paper. (1991): 10.
48 Robert Cassen et al, Does Aid Work (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 307.
49 J. Luttik and H. White, “The Countrywide Effects o f Aid,” Policy Research Working Paper. (1994):
1337.
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literature review on the effectiveness of aid. The definition of effectiveness is relative to
time, place and situation: and could be defined as anything from democratization levels to
economic growth.
When looking at foreign aid historically, one can see that it has been able to
transform entire sectors o f the economy: for example the Green Revolution which forever
changed the face of agriculture was financed in large part by foreign aid. Combinations
of multilateral and bilateral aid have helped combat some of the world’s most rampant
diseases, for example measles through child inoculation and river blindness in south-east
Asia. However foreign aid has also been, as the Bank itself firmly puts it, “an unmitigated
failure:”50 especially in Africa where corruption and bad governance have been some of
the direct consequences of foreign aid.
Here the allocation of aid takes centre stage. Allocation of aid is an important ex
factor in terms of determining the effectiveness of aid. Due to historical and socio
political reasons foreign aid has not always gone to those countries that need it the most.
If a country was a former colony i.e. India being a former British colony, it tended to
receive more aid from the British than say Mozambique (being a former Portuguese
colony) would. Likewise with the advent of the cold war, it was not a question of
effective aid, but of supportive aid, aid was used to prop up regimes all around the globe,
these regimes tended to be democratic and had open economies.
Zaire’s former leader, Mobuto Sese Seko allegedly amassed a personal fortune
through economic exploitation and corruption, financed in part by ‘Western’ foreign aid.
As Meredith Turshen succinctly points out “the policies of the US dominated IMF and

50 World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works. What Doesn’t and Why (Washington DC: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 1.
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World Bank have caused a decline in national health care systems all over Africa.”51 This
is in part due to a lack of coordination between USAID and the international financial
institutions. Therefore it can be seen that foreign aid can be highly effective and highly
ineffective, it all depends on the prevailing socio-economic conditions.
Arguments in the literature assessing the effectiveness of aid on poverty
alleviation have been varied. Mosley puts forward the notion that the desire to help the
poor “does not penetrate very far into administrative procedures, so that such help as the
poor and destitute get from aid is largely adventitious.”52 Cassen however is more
positive, and he argues that poverty-related projects have higher rates of return. However
he too believes that aid projects can help the poor, as long as governments and donors are
on the same page when it comes to implementation and sustainability. What then is the
situation of aid in Africa?
Sub-Saharan Africa, as a region, throughout the 1980’s received more aid than
C '}

any other region in the world,

yet levels of economic growth during this period declined

substantially. So in this sense, one can conclude, like Killick, Holmgren and Knack that
aid, in terms of economic growth has not been effective in sub-Saharan Africa. There is
an entire body o f literature dedicated to discussing the correlation or lack of, between aid
and economic growth.
Another way to look at aid effectiveness in Africa is to take the methodology used
by Lele and Jain, who looked at the extent to which donors and host governments
interacted (in their particular case it was in agriculture): more specifically they looked at
“the donors impact upon recipient’s abilities to choose and implement strategic
51 Merideth Turshen, “US Aid and AIDS in Africa.” Review o f African Political Economy 55 (1992): 95.
52 Paul Mosley, Overseas Aid: It’s Defence and Reform (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987), 181.
53 Killick, 17.
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investments.”54 In their study, they concluded that even though donors have made
invaluable contributions to development, they have not helped governments “face the
inescapable hard work of constructing long term, country specific development
strategies.”55
To add different voices to this debate, the Economic Commission of Africa
(ECA) historically has been dissatisfied with the effectiveness of aid throughout the
continent. However there are studies (United Nations Development Program 1989) that
are favourable to foreign aid in Africa, noting that foreign aid has ostensibly improved
policies, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. For comparative purposes, it should be rioted
that aid in Asia, more specifically South Korea and Taiwan (which both received
approximately $6 billion between 1946 and 1978)56 has been essential to development.
Foreign aid in this instance came in the form of military and economic aid from the
United States.
On this note the literature can tentatively be divided into two camps, those that
believe aid is effective, and those that believe aid is not effective due to other mitigating
factors. Mitigating factors could include an overflow of aid, which above certain levels
starts to have negative effects. Milton Friedman maintains that economic aid does more
harm than good, he objected in particular to the notion that development requires
government planning. To him, what ‘developing’ countries need is not copious amounts
of aid, but an effective work force in a favourable economic situation, without a

54 Uma Lele, Rahul Jain, “Synthesis: Aid to African Agriculture,” in Lele ed. Aid to African
Agriculture: Lessons from two Decades o f Donor Experience. (Washington: World Bank, 1989),
236.
55 Uma Lele, Rahul Jain, 236.
56 Mason, 435.
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favourable economic climate aid will “almost surely retard economic growth.”57 Peter
Bauer has persistently argued that aid given directly to the government leads to the
politicization of life, which in his opinion has very negative consequences, for example
the southern African nation of Zimbabwe where food aid given to the government was
distributed primarily to supporters of the ruling party ZANU PF. Keith Griffin supports
the view held by Bauer by using an econometric analysis focusing on savings and the
productivity of aid financed investment, in which he concludes that aid can technically
harm growth.58
One way in which the Bank focuses on effectiveness is in terms of poverty
reduction. On the other hand, other authors use different variables to measure
effectiveness, from debt relief, democratization levels to aid dependency. Traditionally
the effect of aid is measured by the coefficient of aid/Gross Domestic Product (GDP);
however some o f the complications of this method are noted in a Ryerson University
Conference paper which states that this coefficient measures only the direct effects and
tends to ignore the indirect effects.59 This introduces us to the notion of aid fimgibility
which is discussed later on in the paper. Whereas Griffin and McKinley, citing recent
studies, argue that there is no relationship between aid and growth (in this case assuming
that effectiveness is reflected in economic growth).
It is important to note that “any attempt to assess the effectiveness of
developmental assistance, in particular that of a single institution such as the World

57 Milton Friedman, “Foreign Economic Aid: means and objectives” reprinted in Jagdish Bhagwati and
Richard Eckaus, (1970): 64.
58 Robert Lensik and Harry White. “Are There Negative Returns to Aid?” 11 Nov, 2003. Online. Available
from http://www.ub.rug.n1/eldoc/som/e/99E60/99e60.pdf. 3.
59 Ryerson University. “Regime Changes, Economic Policies, and the effects o f Aid on Growth.” 11 Nov,
2003. Online. Available from http://www.rverson.ca/econ/ConferencePapers/PoliticalStabilitv.pdf.
2.
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Bank, confronts inherent analytical difficulties. The complexity of social and economic
change means that the impact of aid cannot be separated”60 from other factors. As the
literature will show, effective development essentially requires country ownership; as a
result outside actors (bilateral or multilateral aid agencies) are unlikely to be the primary
initiators of development.61 Therefore, where these outside actors are central to the
process of reform, the future sustainability of the reform may be in doubt. Even where
these external actors are clearly important, they will be more effective working with local
government or some other internal institution. Therefore this makes it extremely difficult
to assess blame or credit to any institution or individual, and this stresses the need for
enhanced coordination between respective parties.
The most authoritative and conclusive summary, to date, of World Bank aid
effectiveness is the Bank’s own 1998 summary, ‘Assessing Aid: What Works, What
doesn ’t and Why.’’ This body of literature is the most conclusive because it falls back on
the Banks’ own experience with developmental issues, examining why certain policies
worked and why others failed. The general conclusions in this summary are based on
detailed studies using internal Bank assessments of loans, these assessments were
undertaken by the OED, using econometric analyses of the relationship between aid and
growth. The various conclusions are stated throughout the proceeding literature review.
As the blue-print for assessing aid, the frame work of this review will critically
disseminate information from ‘Assessing Aid' and outline the major theoretical arguments
put forward by the Bank, and contrast this with the view points of other respected
independent academics on aid effectiveness.
60 World Bank, 21.
61 Halsey Rogers, “Role and Effectiveness o f Development Assistance: Lessons from the World Bank
Experience,” World Bank Working Paper. (2002): 29.
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The Bank outlines two key requirements in relation to the effectiveness of aid.
Effective aid requires the right timing and the right combination of capital and ideas.
Simply giving financial assistance to a country will not ensure effectiveness. It could,
depending on the amounts o f aid lead to negative effects. Halsey Rogers notes that
“developmental assistance also includes analysis, advice and capacity building,” it is
often the degree of implementation of these non-lending tools of development that
determines the effectiveness o f the project or policy.63 The timing of assistance is crucial
when helping countries address some of the problems inherent in their economies. Indeed
David Dollar and Paul Collier take this further by adding that the presence of large scale
poverty prior to the Bank’s intervention will almost always increase the effectiveness of
aid.64 Significantly increased country selectivity, due to the knowledge accumulated by
the Bank, has over the years led to a dramatic increase in the effectiveness of aid as
evaluated and noted by the OED.
The current President of the World Bank, James D. Wolfensohn also believes that
for a developmental project to succeed, local governments must have ownership. In his
Comprehensive Developmental Framework outlined in 1999, he argues that
developmental programs must be country owned, not owned by specific donors or the
World Bank.65 This is one of the fundamental areas in which all of the noted theorists on
aid effectiveness agree, for example Rogers, Adams, Dollar and the World Bank all
support this idea.

62 Rogers, 30.
63 Rogers, 31.
64 Paul Collier and David Dollar, “Developmental Effectiveness: What Have We Learnt?” World Bank
Working Paper. (20011: 11.
65 Shantayanan Devarajan, David Dollar and Torgny Holmgren, Aid & Reform in Africa (Washington DC:
Library o f Congress, 2001), xi.
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Michelle Adams points to the glaring need for the involvement of beneficiaries in
project implementation.66 This is crucial because for projects or policies to be considered
effective, they must, according to the World Development Report 2000/20001, foster
ownership by the people for whom the policy or project is ostensibly being
implemented.67 Another major component of Wolfensohn’s developmental framework is
the notion of good governance. To him, good macroeconomic policies cannot be
implemented if the government is ineffective or corrupt.68
James Wolfensohn makes a valid point when citing the need for ‘project
ownership.’ When local governments or other such actors on the economy ‘own’
projects, it takes away the threat of projects being labelled as forms of neo-colonialism.
For example, the southern African nation of Zambia having strong historical ties to the
British Empire, would ideally like to perceive that following independence they are
‘charting their own destiny’ so to speak; they would be doing this by owning or having a
say in developmental projects.
Killick provides a general definition of ‘ownership’ in the context of reform:
Government ownership is at its strongest when the political leadership and its advisers,
with broad support among agencies o f state and civil society, decide of their own volition
that policy changes are desirable, choose what these changes should be and when they
should be introduced, and where these changes become built into parameters o f policy
and administration which are generally accepted as desirable.69

As previously mentioned this definition can be contrasted with a situation in
which reforms are donor initiated and have little domestic support from either local
government or civil society. In which case, the reforms are not likely to succeed: Isham,
66 Michelle Miller-Adams, The World Bank: New Agendas in a Changing World (New York: Routledge
Publishing, 1999), 143.
67 World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2001), 193.
68 James Wolfensohn, Creating an International Development Framework (Washington DC: World Bank,
1999), 3.
69 Tony Killick, Aid and the Political Economy o f Policy Change (New York: Routledge, 1998), 76.
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Kaufmann, and Pritchett attest to this by noting that in distorted environments, where
governments are characterised by corruption, poor property rights and macroeconomic
instability, development projects promoted by donors tend to fail.70
How strongly a country believes that a project or policy will bring benefits affects
the overall amount of effort put into it and the amount of resources made available by
local government. This ties in with the notion that domestic policy often affects aid
effectiveness more so than any other factor: determinants of aid effectiveness if need be
can be broken down exclusively to factors within the recipient country. The World
Development Report 2000/2001 cites a major study on the relationship between donors
and African recipients. The study found that despite some improvements, donors have a
propensity to dictate the project cycle and pay insufficient attention to the preferences of
the government or project beneficiaries.

7

1

Shantayanan Devarajan, David Dollar and Torgny Holmgren using ten African
countries (Ghana, Uganda, Ethiopia, Mali, Tanzania, Cote d ’Ivoire, Kenya, Zambia,
Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria) as case studies, show that when aid supports
a country-owned development strategy, it can lead to sustained growth and poverty
reduction, thus making developmental assistance effective. In the case of Ghana, the
Economic Reform Program supported by World Bank loans enjoyed high levels of
Ghanaian ownership (ownership as previously defined by Tony Killick), which translated
into macroeconomic success, and sustained levels of economic growth. Countries that
have used aid successfully have had local or partial ownership of reforms. Countries that
have made less progress typically have either had powerful vested interests blocking the
70 Jonathan Isham, Daniel Kaufmann and Lant Pritchett, “Civil Liberties, Democracy and the Performance
o f Government Projects,” World Bank Economic Review 11 (21. (1997), 219-242.
71 World Bank. 193.
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implementation of change or have had inadequate infrastructure to support the
implementation of selected reforms.
The most generally accepted theory by scholars of aid effectiveness is the notion
that good policy environments or sound domestic policies create a better atmosphere for
aid effectiveness. The World Bank notes that the extent of a domestic governments own
commitment is crucial to determining the impact of reform. Craig Burnside, David
Dollar, Christopher Gilbert and David Vines concur that to maximise aid effectiveness,
aid should be directed towards governments where there is already an effective policy
regime in place. These are countries where, as noted earlier, further reforms are more
likely to be owned, and are likely to be effectively implemented.72 Burnside and Dollar
however go further by arguing that foreign aid has a strong positive effect on growth on
low income countries with good policies and that the effectiveness of aid is not
measurable in countries with severely distorted policy regimes.

Tony Killick reinforces

their argument by noting that aid transfers have not been effective in promoting growth or
inducing aid reform, except in good policy environments.74
Tony Killick in his 1991 study of aid effectiveness in Africa notes that indigenous
policies pursued by local governments play the most important role in determining aid’s
effectiveness. Ghana’s experience with foreign aid supports this conclusion. Ghana
underwent significant socio-economic reforms in the mid 1980’s, yet in comparison with
other African countries at the time Ghana received a relatively small amount of aid, yet

72 Christopher Gilbert and David Vines, The World Bank: Structure and Policies (Cambridge: University
Press, 2000), 28.
73 Craig Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid, the Incentive Regime, and Poverty Reduction,” World Bank
Working Paper. (1998): 2.
74 Killick, 23.
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was considered a ‘successful reformer’ by the Bank. Kruger et al in their 1989 study on
aid and development provide a detailed description of the benefits of a policy framework:
The most important lesson learned about economic development, and
therefore about the role of assistance, is the significance o f the
overall macroeconomic environment for growth. Over the
past thirty years appreciation o f the importance o f appropriate
trade and exchange rate policies, o f fiscal and monetary policies,
and o f the overall incentive structure provided by government
policies has increased continuously... Experience indicates that the
macroeconomic setting is an important determinant of the success
o f sectoral and project assistance. In countries where the macroeconomic
framework is appropriate, real rates o f return to investment projects tend to be
high.75

The Bank, upon reviewing its own literature and reflecting on its lending
experiences, in 1998 presented evidence on policy environment and foreign aid. The
Bank concluded in several studies that there is no “positive relationship between the level
o f aid receipts and the rate of economic growth in general; however there is a positive
relationship in countries with sound economic management.”76 Directly related to this, is
the combination of well-targeted aid and sound economic management. Halsey Rogers
notes that “well targeted aid not only reduces poverty, but also has far wider effects.”77
Unlike the Bank, he notes that “well-designed aid crowds in private investment, both
domestic and foreign.” 78 As a result, the investment climate in the recipient country
improves, and the ‘crowding-in’ aspect of investment that he mentioned earlier leads to
greater returns to aid; more so than simply poverty reduction.
The Bank citing public investment projects financed by them, in such ventures as
transportation, education and health, comes to conclusions based on the relationship
between the Bank and recipient countries. In countries with good macroeconomic
75 Killick, 25.
76 World Bank, 200.
77 Rogers, 35.
78 Rogers, 35.
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management and efficient public institutions, “projects were 86 percent successful, with
much higher rates of return,” however in countries with “weak policies and institutions,
the corresponding figure is a measly 48 per cent.”79 To support this, comparative studies
done by the Bank show that aid is more effective in Botswana and Bolivia as opposed to
Tanzania and Nicaragua, because Botswana and Bolivia have stronger institutions and
better economic policies.
The World Bank and Burnside and Dollar agree that financial assistance must be
targeted more effectively to low income countries with sound economic management
policies. The problem here is that the majority of countries with poor economic
management policies are likely to be the countries that require the most developmental
aid. Against this argument, the Bank counters by explaining that aid in this case, can be
effective in sectoral reform. Sectoral reform is staff intensive and would lead to the staff
developing methods to test their ideas and reforms. Therefore even in situations where
policies and institutions are weak, donors have tried to find something useful to finance.
The Bank also counters by adding that, aid can be effective even in the most distorted
environments and that in difficult environments effective assistance is more about ideas
or knowledge accumulation than money or projects.
Theorists differ on the intricate effects of conditionality, but in general there is a
common perception that conditionality does not promote effective aid. Conditionality can
be defined as: conditions attached to financial loans, that usually involve the adoption of
policies designed to lay the foundations for sustainable economic growth. Michel
Chossudovsky focuses on the negative aspects of policy conditionalities that are normally

79 World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works. What Doesn’t and Why (Washington DC: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 15.
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attached to loans. The objective of these conditionalities according to Chossudovsky is to
maintain nations in a “strait-jacket” which prevents them from embarking upon
independent national policies.80 This point supports the theory of the ‘Conditionality
Bank’ posited by Gilbert and Vines in which the ability to impose conditionality is
central to the Bank’s effectiveness.81 The Bank acquires its strength based on its ability to
package together lending, developmental assistance and research: by lending to approved
projects, the Bank is able to increase its prospects for debt servicing and repayment. Due
to the Bank’s vast knowledge resources, it is readily able to address issues of market
failure and policy risk, which in turn enable the Bank to devise conditions on loans and to
impose these conditions.
Gilbert and Vines note: “in the absence of Bank conditionality, project returns
may not be sufficient to induce investment.”82 Therefore the effects of conditionality will
be to raise the levels of investment returns, in doing so attracting finance to the private
sector. The Bank as an institution can capture some of the gains from conditionality; in
doing this the Bank adds value to some of the projects that it lends to. So, conditionality
if effective, would serve to raise the amount of payments back to the Bank.
The Bank, on the other hand, argues that that the dynamics between aid donors
and recipients explain why conditionality inevitably fails. The essential problem is that
the recipient countries do not see the conditions set on the loans as binding, however this
does not stop the donors from contributing aid. Therefore what tends to happen is that,
while compliance with conditions tends to be low, the release rate of loans continues to
be high. This, in extreme cases can lead to increased debt burdens for the recipient
80 Michel Chossudovsky, The Globalisation o f Poverty (New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1997), 51.
81 Gilbert and Vines, 56.
82 Gilbert and Vines, 56.
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countries, as conditions attached to Bank adjustment loans continue to increase. To lead
us on to the next point, it should be noted that conditionality is unlikely to bring about
lasting reform if there is no strong domestic movement for change.
Unlike the Bank, Paul Collier argues that conditionality fails to bring about
effective policy change; he argues that governments who are not committed to effective
change have incentives to “renege on commitments,”83 and due to wider political
economy considerations, donors have no legitimate means of enforcing the sanction of
not providing aid. Collier suggests in this scenario, for greater effectiveness, aid should
be provided to countries with good policies, rather than offered as an incentive to bring
about policy reform; this according to him would ultimately lead to increased
effectiveness.
The Bank acknowledges throughout the majority of the literature that reforms
need to focus on creating and transmitting knowledge and capacity. In this situation,
developmental projects should support initiatives that improve public service delivery.
The argument here is that local knowledge and institutional capacity are one of the most
important outputs of development assistance. This will hopefully lead to greater
empowerment of the people through their participation.
The World Development Report 2000/ 2001 emphasises the importance of donor
coordination and coherency as a means of increasing aid effectiveness. Coherency
referring to making all instititions accountable, to a certain extent, to a World Bank
dominated agenda. When donors cross priorities, this can translate itself on the ground
and quite often create an unworkable environment for a recipient government. The sheer
number of donors and donor projects can in itself be challenging. For example, at one
83 Gilbert and Vines, 268.
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point there were 405 donor-funded projects in the Mozambican Ministry of Health alone.
In Ghana during the same period 64 different government institutions were receiving
aid.84
In 1999 the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved the
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). This strategy took into consideration the neo
liberal notions of ownership and donor coordination, and in doing so established a new
framework for development assistance. Halsey Rogers in his Bank report notes that the
underlying goals of the PRSP process are to ensure broad based country ownership of
poverty reduction strategies, focus on results that really matter for the poor and to build
stronger relationships between low income countries and the donor community.85 Bank
and IMF representatives meet regularly to discuss ways in which the PRSP’s can be made
more effective. This open method of dialogue, in the long run, will ultimately serve the
developing world as these multilateral institutions gradually improve their methods of
impact analysis.
A key concept of development aid discussed by the Bank, Collier, Burnside and
Killick is that of fungibility. Suppose an aid donor gives money to build a primary school
in a poor country. If the recipient government would have built the school anyway, then
the consequence of the aid is to release resources for the government to spend on other
items.86 This by definition is aid fungibility. Aid fungibility has had profound
implications for measuring aid effectiveness. Project specific evaluations have not
reflected the true impact of aid effectiveness. Since aid is likely ‘freeing up’ government
resources for other activities, there is no way o f measuring the final impact.
84 World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2001), 193.
85 Rogers, 43.
86 Gilbert and Vines, 211.
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Devarajan and Swaroop note: “a donor project may actually have a very high rate
of economic return, but at the margin it could be financing something very different, even
undesirable expenditures.”87 The alternative view to this is supported by Stephen Jones
who stresses that the Bank should recognise fungibility and lend to governments of
countries where developmental returns are generally high, rather than focusing on
narrowly defined project returns.

88

In essence, fungibility becomes a problem only when

the objectives of donor and recipient differ. If aid is not fungible, evaluating the overall
effect of aid according to the Bank is easy. The effect is simply the collective effort of
individual projects undertaken in different sectors of the economy. For example, if health
care reform is important, more projects in that area should lead to greater improvements
in this area.
In the Bank’s 1998 study on aid, the implications of fungibility for evaluating
projects are discussed. One theory put forward is that donor financing of projects raises
government spending exactly as if it were part of the budgetary plan. This implies that,
even as the Bank is financing projects, an assessment of aid’s effect as a financial transfer
depends on a judgement of overall government spending.89 This would ultimately involve
assessing the rationale for government spending. This goes back to the Bank’s insistence
for good policy environments, in the sense that in countries with good policies donors can
provide large amounts of assistance as budgetary support, knowing the resources will be
well used. If aid is indeed fungible, then measuring its effectiveness creates both short
and long term problems: short term results of say an aid financed health project would be

87 Gilbert and Vines, 207.
88 Gilbert and Vines, 266.
89 World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works. What Doesn’t and Why (Washington DC: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 60.
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more visible than the long term results. The immediate results are “visible:” for example
the ‘big, shiny new hospital’ however the long term effect of say a decline in infant
mortality is not immediately recognised. The question that needs to be asked here is what
are the implications of this for measuring effectiveness? One obvious consequence of
this is that effectiveness has to be measured over time: in doing so aid effectiveness
would recognise fungibility as a viable component of effectiveness.
Buckley stresses the importance of institutional factors in aid effectiveness. By
focusing on the role of institutional performance, particularly in light of the Asian crisis,
Buckley comes to several conclusions. World Bank projects are almost twice as likely to
fail in low income countries with low institutional quality and that strong institutions
more than double the likelihood that a country undergoing adjustment can sustain policy
reform.90 Conversely, he also reports that Bank initiatives aimed at improving
institutional capacity through civil service reform, have been among the weakest
performing areas of the Banks portfolio.
The Bank’s own study on institutional capacity focuses on the composition and
quality of public expenditure as a key determinant of aid effectiveness. Success, with
regards to institutional capacity can be measured on two different levels. On a micro
level, success can be measured by examining specific projects or policies, whereas on a
macro level success can be measured by examining economy wide growth and poverty
reduction. The Banks analysis 'Assessing Aid: What Works, What doesn’t and Why’ notes
that when donor projects fail, it is often because of weak institutions and public
organizations: there is plenty of evidence that institutional capability affects overall

90 R. Buckley, 1998 Annual Review o f Development Effectiveness (Washington DC: World Bank, 1999),
4.
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economic growth and the success of investments. For example, one recent study found
that “over the 30 years to 1994, countries with sound policies and capable and effective
government institutions grew at 3 percent per capita each year - while those with sound
policies but weak institutions grew at only 1.4 percent a year.”91
One obvious way of determining effectiveness is to ask the simple question, what
would have happened in the absence of aid? Case study analysis presented by the
majority of scholars92 show that the absence of donor financing would have had adverse
effects on the recipients’ nations. Without the assistance of structural adjustment
programs, which were financed by the Bank, Kenya’s economic growth between 1985
and 1990 would not have been as great (using gross domestic product as a
measurement).93 Essentially this shows that evaluating projects’ effectiveness requires
not just a thorough examination of what is going on the ground, but judging what would
have happened had there been no aid at all.
Paul Collier considers three dominant debates on the effectiveness of aid that
centre around the relationship between donor agencies and recipient governments. Collier
examines conditionality, and concludes that conditionality can be seen as ineffective. In
the second debate, he examines the notion that aid dependency is undermining national
capacities of recipient nations. The third debate is around the suggestion that
developmental aid, by focusing on individual nations, has missed its comparative
advantage94 in the financing of coordinated development schemes. To this effect, Collier

91 World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works. What Doesn’t and Why (Washington DC: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 89.
92 Dollar, Holmgren, Devarajan and Collier.
93 Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren, 510.
94 When one nation’s opportunity cost o f producing an item is less than another nations opportunity cost o f
producing that item.
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suggests that aid can act as a catalyst for regional cooperation, and in doing so promote
development.
Stephen Knack found that in general there is no concrete relationship between
foreign aid and democracy, however he does note that foreign aid can “potentially
contribute towards democratization in several ways: through technical assistance i.e.
focusing on the electoral process, through conditionality and by improving education,
which research shows is conducive to democratization.”95 Therefore the tensions that
exist between the two notions of ‘development and democracy’ are played out through
international institutions like the World Bank and IMF, and it can be firmly concluded
that there is some type of relationship between foreign aid and levels of democratization,
the strength of the relationship is what is relevant.
The literature clearly shows that the effectiveness of the Bank varies depending
on the specific scenario and economic climate. The selection of Lesotho for this study is
designed to focus on a southern African country which has been significantly neglected
in developmental discourse. According to the literature ownership of projects and sound
domestic policy are essential for project effectiveness. Countless research findings attest
to the positive effects of ownership and sound policy, not only World Bank studies but
studies conducted by other multilateral and bilateral institutions, although these studies
are not directed primarily at establishing effectiveness of aid.
With regards to aid effectiveness the literature concludes that aid is very effective,
but only under the right conditions: because even critics of aid like Friedman
acknowledge that certain types of aid are effective. For him, it was military aid. And

95 Stephen Knack, “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy,” World Bank Working Paper no. 238. (2000):
2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

44

while Bauer argues that aid leads to the politicization of life, he does not make the
distinction between types of aid. Developmental aid does not necessarily have to go
through governments, it can go through non-governmental organizations, and in this way
be very effective.
One fundamental issue that emerges out of the literature review is that of
sustainability. There is no point in having ‘project ownership’ and ‘a good policy
environment’ if changes implemented cannot be sustained. Better policies, good resource
allocation and strategic implementation are all rendered irrelevant if long-term
sustainability cannot be achieved. The task then becomes ensuring that sustainability be a
focal point o f future developmental policy formations with regards to foreign aid.
After going through the majority of the literature on aid effectiveness, it is safe to
conclude that the methodological approaches taken in the majority of the literature on aid
effectiveness tend to be more quantitative than qualitative in nature. Although
quantitative studies are very useful, qualitative research inevitably provides accurate
information that can be used to fully understand the extent of the problem: in this case
how to make aid more effective. World Bank professionals (the policy makers) and those
on the ground would benefit greatly from detail-oriented qualitative research.
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III. METHODOLOGY

Several factors were taken into consideration when determining which country was to be
used as a case study for this analysis. While most studies focusing on southern Africa
would look to either incorporate or focus on South Africa, primarily because South
Africa post-apartheid has a lot more relevance to the international community, this study
chose to focus on Lesotho. The selection of Lesotho might at first seem odd, but there are
reasons for the selection. Firstly, apart from the literature contributed by the dominant
International Financial Institutions, there is a distinct lack of academic literature on
Lesotho’s developmental challenges. Secondly, Lesotho is located in sub-Saharan Africa,
which historically is the most impoverished region in the world; and thirdly
manageability, Lesotho is a small country and information is easily accessible, and the
researcher is fluent in the local dialect Sesotho. All the factors above combined to make
the choice of Lesotho fairly simple, and the idea that this study would inevitably
contribute to an on-going process of academia further strengthened the country rationale.
In terms of project rationale, the 1995 PRP was chosen after comparing various
other projects in terms of scale and perceived influence of the project. It was then decided
that the PRP was the obvious choice because of its large scale focus on the health sector,
while other projects have focused on the health sector, none can match the scale of the
1995 PRP. Data regarding the 1995 PRP was also readily available, making it the most
reasonable choice in terms of project selection/ rationale.
Learning from failure and understanding the sources of success, to an institution
like the World Bank is imperative: because this is ultimately the way forward. As
previously noted, the fundamental purpose of this study is to provide contemporary
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information on the effectiveness of the Bank’s activities in Lesotho, within the context of
the health care system as it relates to the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan. While
there has been a substantial amount of data outlining the projects and policies of the
Bank, there is a distinct lack of follow up, project specific data, particularly in the context
of southern Africa. This said, there are however impact evaluation assessments, notably
through the Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department (OED).96 These assessments
demand a substantial amount of information, time and resources and therefore tend to be
carried out on a regional or country specific basis and very rarely on a project specific
basis.
Given the Bank’s sharpened push towards poverty reduction, any well researched
analysis of the Bank, focusing on the effectiveness of developmental aid would be useful.
In particular it would be useful to Bank staff members and the greater international
development academia, who devise and implement projects throughout the world.
Especially since poverty reduction is increasingly being associated with economic
growth, which, in the ‘developing’ world is traditionally achieved through developmental
aid. This study coincides with the Millennium Developmental Goals, which essentially
place the emphasis on eradicating extreme poverty through the development of local
infrastructure (infrastructure in this case being investment in human resources). This
focus on infrastructure relates well with the theoretical aspects of this study, which argue
that good infrastructure leads to greater aid effectiveness. It will also be interesting to see
the extent to which Lesotho followed the policies recommended by the Bank’s 1995

96 OED is an independent unit within the World Bank that reports directly to the Bank’s directors: the OED
is an evaluation unit, designed to assess the effectiveness o f the Bank’s work.
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poverty assessment, specifically focusing public expenditure on human resource
investments.
In order to rationalize the final methodology chosen for this study, it is essential
to briefly outline the various types of methodology available for a study of this nature.
Some of the more common methodologies used by the Bank to assess effectiveness of aid
operations can be found in the Bank’s recently prepared handbook: 1Evaluating the
Impact ofDevelopment Projects on Poverty: A Handbook for Practitioners. ’ Judy Baker
notes that “regardless of the project type or questions being addressed, the design of each
impact evaluation will be unique, depending on factors such as the type of data available,
local capacity and timing and budget concerns.”97 Every Bank project is different or has a
different set of circumstances to deal with; there can be no homogenous method of
evaluating effectiveness: particularly project/ policy oriented effectiveness over an
extended period of time. Baker notes that there are several techniques for impact
evaluation: experimental designs, quasi experimental designs, qualitative methods, costeffectiveness analysis and theory based analysis. She also notes that stronger
methodologies often combine methods, which often lead to more conclusive results. The
following is a brief summary of the advantages and disadvantages of each methodology
as noted by Judy Baker.
Experimental and quasi-experimental techniques for evaluating project impact are
quantitative in nature. Experimental designs are considered to be the most effective
method of evaluation. This method focuses on “comparable treatment and control groups

97 Judy Baker, Evaluating the Impact o f Development Projects on Poverty: A Handbook for Practitioners
(Washington D.C: World Bank, 2000), vii.
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that are statistically equivalent to one another, given well defined sample sizes.”98 The
main benefit of this technique is its simplicity in interpreting results. The main criticism,
she notes, is that these designs are often considered biased due to the denial of benefits to
otherwise eligible members for the purposes of the study.
According to Baker “quasi-experimental designs can be used to carry out an
evaluation when it is not possible to construct treatment groups through experimental
design. In other words one tries to pick an ideal comparison that matches the treatment
group from a larger survey.”99 The main benefit of these designs is that they draw on
existing data sources and are therefore often easier and quicker to implement. The
principal disadvantage of the quasi-experimental methodology is that of selection bias.100
Qualitative techniques “focus on understanding processes, behaviours and
conditions as they are perceived by the individuals or groups being studied.”101
Qualitative methods are often used in situations where “participant observation can
provide insight into the ways in which households and local communities perceive how a
project is affecting them.”

107

The benefits of qualitative methods are, primarily that they

are flexible, and can be specifically tailored to the particular study using open ended
questions. The primary disadvantages are the “subjectivity involved in data collection,
the lack of a comparison group and the lack of statistical robustness,”103 assuming
statistics are a necessary part of the research.

Baker, 6.
w Baker, 7.
100 Selection bias relates to unobservables that may bias outcomes i.e. pre-existing conditions.
101 Baker, 7.
102 Baker, 7.
103 Baker, 7.
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Cost benefit analysis enables policy makers to measure program efficiency by
measuring economic efficiency of a programme against the program benefits. Whereas
theory based evaluations are based on theories as to whether or not the particular project
will work: each theory along with its assumptions would be assessed during
implementation of the project. Both of these methods, though useful, are only feasible at
certain times during a project: cost benefit analyses are normally implemented at the end
of a project, and theory based evaluations at the beginning of a project.
In light of Judy Baker’s techniques for measuring project effectiveness, this study
intends to do a qualitative assessment to measure the long term effectiveness of the 1995
Poverty Reduction Action Plan. Qualitative assessment has been chosen for several
reasons. Qualitative research in this context focuses on an expected outcome, and the
methods available through qualitative research are the most conclusive in the sense that
various sources are consulted in the research process. Also qualitative methods are fairly
open ended, and, if need be, the data gathered in the study can be quantified.
For this study, the best way to gauge the long term effectiveness of aid in the
health sector would be to get reactions from individuals themselves, namely doctors,
hospital administrators and other such health care professionals. It would also be
necessary to carefully dissect the criteria put forward by the Bank, to determine whether
or not their set goals were achieved ‘on the ground’ in the allotted time period. The idea
here is to contrast the different approaches and lenses used to examine the same
“problem.” The 1995 Poverty Reduction Plan, as in most policies implemented by IFI’s
takes a very top-down approach to poverty reduction through health, whereas this study
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proposes to approach the same issues from the bottom up to highlight the differences, if
in fact there are any between the two methods.
Given the reliance on interviews for this study, it is crucial that the ‘right’ people
be interviewed. Not only will those with specific knowledge of the Bank’s activities in
Lesotho be interviewed, but also those with knowledge on the effectiveness of aid in the
health sector. Therefore interviews will be the primary mode of research for this study.
Whether the interviews conducted are elite interviews with government officials or focus
groups carried out amongst the local people affected by the Bank’s projects, these
interviews would inherently provide insight on how the people feel with regards to
effectiveness o f the aid provided by the Bank. Interviews would allow for reliable data
quality, and would minimise biased conclusions, the idea being that focus groups and
elite interviews would provide more balanced results. Maximising the validity of the
information that is provided ensures that the overall methodology is fairly simple.
Simplicity in turn, hopefully leads to conclusive results.
For this study, the results of the interviews were consolidated and compared with
the goals stated in the 1995 PRP and a conclusion was reached with regards to the
effectiveness o f the Banks foreign aid. However, the conclusions reached in this
particular study cannot be generalized to the effectiveness of foreign aid on a global
scale. The literature review clearly illustrates that the Bank’s numerous projects
worldwide are unique with regards to circumstance and desired results. This research, on
a micro level, will solely highlight the situation of the Bank in Lesotho, and draw
conclusions on research done in and for the benefit of Lesotho, and the World Bank in
Lesotho.
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INTERVIEW SAMPLE QUESTIONS
The following framework of questions were selectively posed to those chosen for the
interview process:
1. Are you aware of any projects or policies implemented by the World Bank to improve
the health sector over the last ten years?
2. O f the policies mentioned what were the most prominent projects/ policies during this
period?
3. Are you aware that discussions between the government of Lesotho and the World
Bank led to the formulation of policy designed, in part to invest in the health sector in the
1995 PRP?
4. In your own opinion what has contributed to the challenges faced by the World Bank
(if in fact there were any) in implementing its projects/ policies?
5. And how do you think you can correct these problems?
6. Have the indicators of ‘well-being’ improved, decreased or stayed the same during this
period?
7. What is the average life expectancy in Lesotho?
8. What is the leading cause of death for adults in Lesotho?
9. Is there a good working relationship between those implementing the desired goals (i.e.
doctors) and the administrators (i.e. government)?
10. Do health professionals have any input into projects that may be planned by the
government in consultation with the World Bank, or is it merely imposed from above?
11. Are children under five exempt from health fees?
12. Is there free basic health coverage in Lesotho?
13 . If the answer is no: In your opinion is free health coverage a realistic goal? If the
answer is yes: how has this been successfully implemented?
14. Is there geographic equity in hospitals/ clinics throughout Lesotho?
15. Do local clinics retain the income that they receive?
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IV. OVERVIEW OF HEALTH SECTOR
The literature on the health sector in Lesotho is fairly limited, the most prominent voice
in the matter is the Lesotho Health Sector Reform Plan produced by the Ministry of
Health and Social Welfare in 2000. This report provides contemporary and historical
information with regards to the status and development of the health sector. The report
focuses primarily on health initiatives implemented by the Lesotho government post
independence. Although the government report focuses on the domestic issues plaguing
the health sector, it gives significant insight and crucial background information with
regards to policy and project success/ failure that the government, independent of other
local and international actors has endured over the years. With this in mind, this section
seeks to provide a brief summary of the World Banks health care promotional activities,
give a brief historical outline of the health sector in Lesotho highlighting key policies
implemented by the government and lastly provide an outline of the 1995 Poverty
Reduction Action Plan.
The World Bank has increasingly been active in facilitating health reform in the
developing world. A significant portion of the Millennium Developmental Goals has
contributed to making health care priorities an increased part of the general Country
Assessment Strategies. Globally, the Bank is the “largest external funder of health care
programmes, with new commitments of $1.3 billion a year for health, nutrition and
population projects.”104 In general, these sectoral projects have enjoyed relative success
throughout the developing world, particularly in human development indicators, i.e. life
expectancy and child mortality.

104 Rogers, 49.
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An example of this can be seen in central Africa: in Mali the Bank’s project
lending contributed to the increase in children being vaccinated against tetanus (this rose
from 18% to 50%).105 “Through its support to policy reform, technical assistance, and
financing, the Bank has helped expand geographical access to basic health services,
sponsored valuable training for service providers, and contributed advice and other
important inputs to government basic health services.”106 More significantly; however,
particularly for southern Africa, has been the Bank’s push to stem the HIV epidemic. Aid
for HIV since the late eighties is close $1.5 billion, with the majority of this aid coming
post 1998.107
The first health related facilities established in Lesotho were established during
the colonial era by the British. The British set up these facilities almost exclusively
around the urban settlements, and in doing so, completely neglected the rural out-posts of
Lesotho. It was in fact the churches that established other health services around the
country. However since the churches relied solely on patient fees for their maintenance,
they were not able to provide a wide range of services. ‘Church clinics’ in effect
dominated the landscape of pre-independent Lesotho; however post-independence
different medical facilities emerged.
The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare is responsible for providing health
services in Lesotho. In Lesotho the health care system is made up of a hierarchy of
different institutions. There are currently four types of medical facility with differing
levels of staff training and resources. The smallest unit of health care is visible at the
village level; the medical centres found here are served by ‘health workers’ who are
105 Rogers, 49.
106 Rogers, 50.
107 Rogers, 49.
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trained to deal with minor treatments and not with the more complex medical procedures.
These medical centres also function as satellites for the regional health centres. The next
level up, are clinics or health centres: these clinics are managed by nurses and therefore
the skilled labour in terms of training is that of a nurse. The next level up one has
eighteen hospitals serving specific regions including Queen Elizabeth II Hospital which
also serves as a district hospital. Associated with Queen Elizabeth II Hospital are Filter
Clinics, which to a certain extent seek to offload Queen Elizabeth II Hospital of its
district function by providing outpatient care where necessary.
From an historical perspective the health sector in Lesotho can be characterized
by the fact that throughout the years following independence, the government, as any
well functioning government would, has continually attempted to introduce new
initiatives in an attempt to improve the general health status of the Basotho people. These
initiatives have had varying degrees of success. However the successes have been very
limited due, partly, to the fact that they were reactive as opposed to being proactive.108
By reactive, one refers to the fact that the majority of the policies initiated have been a
response to whatever ‘crisis’ dominates at the time. Whereas proactive refers to
essentially being aware of a problem and dealing with it accordingly before it becomes
serious: in other words the notion of controlling a ‘crisis’ before it arises.
Hand in hand with reactive measures came the notion of ‘top-down’ initiatives
which are not only donor driven but donor dependent. The reference to ‘top-down’
suggests that the donors implemented (primarily through funding) the majority of the
measures that were used. The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW) in their

108 Ministry o f Health and Social Welfare, Lesotho Health Sector Reforms Plan. (Maseru, Ministry o f
Health and Social Welfare, 2000), 4.
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forementioned report on health conclude that “the effect of this [top down initiatives] is
that, once donors withdraw their support to a given project or programme, the
sustainability thereof becomes severely compromised.”109
The first initial attempt to initiate reform in the health sector came in 1979 with
the adoption of the Primary Health Care (PHC) strategy for the delivery of services, part
of the PHC strategy was the social objective of “Health For All by the Year 2000 (HFA2000).” At around the same time, the World Bank implemented its first major health
project in Lesotho, the Population and Health project (1985- 1992). The HFA-2000 set up
several targets with regards to the delivery of health services: a decentralization policy,
the introduction of a multi-sectoral approach to the provision of health services, a Health
Service Area Strategy (HSA), the introduction of the Nurse Clinician Cadre, the
introduction of the Community Health Worker Programme and the District Management
Improvement Project (DMI).110 This policy can effectively be considered the first in a
series o f ‘formal’ attempts to reform the health sector. A brief summary of each target is
necessary to understand the scale, scope and significance of this strategy.
The decentralization policy implemented was at the time meant to do two things:
decentralize functions such as planning and budgeting, which historically were performed
by and exclusive to central levels of government, and promote community awareness in
matters related to their own health and social welfare. This policy however was
unsuccessful. The multi-sectoral approach to the provision of health services was
designed to make use of the advances being made in other sectors i.e. road constructions

109 Ministry o f Health and Social Welfare, Lesotho Health Sector Reforms Plan. (Maseru, Ministry o f
Health and Social Welfare, 2000), 4.
110 Ministry o f Health and Social Welfare, 6.
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and the rural water supply programme to facilitate access, especially on the periphery, to
health services.
The HSA was designed to restructure Lesotho around eighteen Health Service
Areas. Part o f the reason behind this was to entrench the decentralization policy,
therefore making administration that much easier, in the sense that each area would have
“ownership” over its health centre. The Nurse Clinician Cadre was implemented to
address the issue of personnel and “the lack of capacity within the nursing cadre to
implement and manage PHC.”111 Under this strategy the nurses were expected to act as
equivalents to doctors, in the sense that they could diagnose diseases and prescribe
certain medicinal drugs.
The Community Health Worker Programme was a part of the multi-sectoral
approach to health care, and was designed to facilitate interaction between village level
workers of other ministries i.e. education and agriculture. The District Management
Improvement Project was introduced to “improve the managerial capacity of the ministry.
It was directed particularly at management structures at HSA level.”

i | ^

In the years following the implementation of the PHC as the major strategy for
health services, relative gains were achieved in each of the sub-sectors. Notably, the
nursing cadre was strengthened substantially in the early 1980’s, with the establishment
of the Nurse Clinician cadre. This in essence raised the overall number of active nurses in
the field, particularly in the rural areas. However, more recently there has been a
significant amount of disinterest shown by the majority of nurses to pursue this career
path, which leads us to an issue that will become more relevant as the chapter unfolds,

111 Ministry o f Health and Social Welfare, 6.
112 Ministry o f Health and Social Welfare, 6.
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namely that of sustainability. The Community Health Worker Programme has also
enjoyed relative gains, to date, the programme has succeeded in training approximately
six thousand community health workers113, although, as the Lesotho Health Sector
Reform Plan notes, there needs to be an assessment taken to determine exactly how many
of these community health workers are active in their respective communities, again
bringing us back to the notion on sustainability. The Bank, through the PHC also funded
filter clinics (via the 2nd Population, Health & Nutrition Project PHN-II).114
The improvements noted under the PHC, before the 1995 PRP came into play
have predominantly been short-term modest gains. Although a lot of progress was made,
time soon eroded any gains made by the health sector. The difficulty became sustaining
the resources, both financial and human, needed to maintain the PHC at required levels.
This combined with the dual administrative health system in Lesotho which pitted the
MOHSW against the Christian Health Association of Lesotho (CHAL), led to
“fragmented and uncoordinated delivery of health services.”115 Lastly the persistently
high population growth rate combined with an unclear policy framework put a huge
strain on the health system, thus resulting in a serious erosion of gains.
The 1995 Round Table Conference, the last major conference before the
emergence of the 1995 PRP identified several constraints to the health system iin Lesotho.
Some of these constraints mentioned include: absorptive capacity constraints, the
centralization of the decision-making process and shortage of resources. It is under these
conditions that the formulation of the 1995 PRP was to materialise. Hence the importance

113 Ministry o f Health and Social Welfare, 6.
114 Filter clinics will be defined in greater detail in the up-coming pages.
115 Ministry o f Health and Social Welfare, 9.
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given to investing in human resources, to tackle this lack of staff/ training and other such
human resources.
The underlying problem with the PHC is not the theory or practicality of the
strategy. The main problem facing the PHC and indeed the health sector in Lesotho is
that o f sustainability. To bring the PHC to the contemporary socio-economic climate in
Lesotho: the relentless problems that face the health sector in Lesotho, those of staff and
equipment shortages and inadequate infrastructure (the extent of these particular
problems will be discussed in greater details in the next chapter), adversely affect the
assurance of sustainability with regards to the implementation of the PHC as the main
driving force behind health reform in Lesotho. More recently with the advent of the HIV/
Aids pandemic, there have been increasing calls to reform the health care system in
Lesotho.
In fact the primary conclusions of the Lesotho Health Sector Reform Plan are that
the health sector in Lesotho has not been able to fulfill its obligations.
By all accounts the health sector in Lesotho has not been able to
fully fulfil the obligation that it has to the people o f Lesotho. The
country is still heavily burdened with high rates of morbidity and
mortality. Personnel currently employed within the system, are not
only inadequate, but are de-moralized and highly de-motivated. At
the same time a significant proportion o f health facilities in the
country, are in appalling states o f disrepair. There are also chronic
shortages o f drugs and other medical supplies.116

In light of the attempts made by the government through the PHC, it is also
crucial to know that other attempts have been made to reform the health sector notably
through the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plans’ investment in health care through
human resources, which is the main focus of this study.

116 Ministry o f Health and Social Welfare, 4.
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The 1995 PRP in part was a response to the 1994 Country Assessment Strategy
(CAS): the CAS took into account the Lesotho governments’ vision for its developmental
trajectory. The 1994 CAS according to Bank details was a three pronged strategy for
growth aimed primarily to help the government of Lesotho to “maintain and deepen
macroeconomic and structural reforms,” to “improve capacity to implement the
programme” and to “capture the benefits of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project
(LHWP).”117 Basically what the 1994 CAS did was recognize the serious poverty
situation that Lesotho was in, attribute this to the lack of growth in the private sector and
concluded that prominent sectors of the economy like health needed more immediate
assistance.
By all means and purposes, the Bank admits that the 1994 CAS was moderately
successful in fulfilling its goals. The most successful aspect of the strategy being the
LHWP: the Bank supported LHWP helped Lesotho generate a considerable amount of
growth. The educational sector also enjoyed significant successes through the CAS
whereas no significant progress was made in the health sector. So essentially, the 1994
CAS defined the parameters in which the 1995 PRP would formulate itself.
Before delving in to the 1995 PRP it must be noted that in Lesotho there are very
few external players who support (financially) the MOHSW. The donors that do exist
(UNFPA, WHO, UNICEF) participate primarily in coordination and implementation, but
as stated in the introduction only Irish Aid, AfDB and the World Bank actually provide
direct financial support to the health sector. “The support from the other partners is

117 Hassan, 13.
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focused on specific sub-sector programs e.g. UNICEF supports immunization,”118 while
the Bank focuses on providing financial along with technical guidance.

118 Project Information Document (PID), Report No. AB 2777
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1995 POVERTY REDUCTION ACTION PLAN
The 1995 PRP exemplifies on a smaller scale the World Bank’s approach to poverty
reduction during the 1990’s. Not only was there great emphasis on investing in human
resources, there was also the need for private sector development, the commonly held
perception was that private sector development would foster labour intensive growth, and
that this could ideally be done through the agriculture and the manufacturing industries.
This is especially significant for a country like Lesotho where the labour force is growing
substantially year by year and under current conditions the economy’s absorptive
capacity is severely limited. Other tenets of 1990’s Bank policy were also a significant
part of the PRP, i.e. improving institutional capacity and strengthening the social safety
net. For example the Bank notes that through ‘experience and analysis’ countries can
reduce poverty quicker if they focus on empowering and investing in the poor people
(invest in human resources). One significant way to do this, apart from education is
through health.
Within the context of poverty reduction the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan,
as previously mentioned chose to focus on specific aspects of the health care sector,
namely:
• Exempt children less than five from fees
• Introduce a free basic health service
• Increase geographic equity
• Allow local facilities to retain certain fees119
N o specific reasons were given as to w hy the Bank chose to focus on these particular

aspects of health care. With the overarching mission of the Bank being poverty reduction,
logic suggests that the Bank, in choosing these particular aspects was aiming to do just

119 Hassan, 12.
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this. The Banks health policies generally tend to be based “on disease-specific morbidity
and mortality needs”120 while concentrating on investing in priority areas.
A major component of the 1995 PRP with regards to the health sector was the
Second Population, Health and Nutrition Project, a US$12.1 million project funded
primarily by the ID A :121 although it should also be noted that the European Union and
the Irish government provided parallel funding. As noted in the project evaluation
summary the project objectives ranged from decentralizing health service infrastructure,
reducing rates o f population growth, reducing morbidity and mortality, enhancing
economic efficiency o f the health care system and strengthening support systems for
health planning.
These objectives provide the framework for the specific goals outlined with
regards to the health care system in the 1995 PRP. Geographic equity is essence is the
decentralization o f the health service infrastructure, while enhancing economic efficiency
and introducing a free basic health care system can be related to exempting children less
than five from fees. Allowing local clinics to retain certain fees can be seen as
strengthening support systems for health care planning: strengthening support essentially
means promoting local quality improvements at health facilities. The goal of local
facilities retaining fees was to support medical facilities in increasing “revenue utilization
to recover 15% of recurrent costs.”122 Therefore, the justifications for focusing on certain
aspects of the health care industry within the PRP are all validated by the Bank ’s over
arching objectives as put forward through the Second Population, Health and Nutrition
Project.
120 World Bank, Implementation Completion Report. Lesotho #18507. (Washington. World Bank, 1998), 1
121 World Bank, 1.
122 World Bank, Implementation Completion Report. Lesotho #18507. (Washington. World Bank, 1998), 4.
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The next chapter focuses on the qualitative methods used to gauge the
effectiveness of the 1995 PRP. Approximately 3 months were spent in Lesotho
conducting field research primarily though interviews. The results of these interviews are
chronicled in the next chapter which will provide insight on Bank effectiveness in
Lesotho.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Y. INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTION
As already established, the World Bank notes that in order to improve the health care
sector it is essential to improve service delivery by strengthening sectoral and local
institutions, which in essence means improving or strengthening public service delivery.
Public service delivery on a micro-level, because on a micro-level, improvements are far
more visible than on a macro-level, the changes (with regards to health care) that the
1995 PRP sought to make fall into this category. This chapter using the aid of interviews
conducted over a three day period between September 29th and October 1st 2004, will
outline the specific responses to various questions as posed to several prominent
members of the ‘health community’ in Lesotho.
The questions were designed to aid the process of gauging the effectiveness of the
World Bank’s stated health care developmental objectives as outlined in the 1995 Poverty
Reduction Action Plan. The format followed will be to state the question posed, and
detail the collective responses o f those individuals who were capable of responding to the
question.
In the course of researching Bank policies in Lesotho several key people were
consulted with regards to various initiatives undertaken by the government in conjunction
with the World Bank. As previously noted, in order to fully ascertain World Bank
effectiveness it was crucial that right group of people be interviewed: those selected for
the interview process include Bank representatives, health professionals and government
officials.
The following people were interviewed: the Director of Health Planning in the
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, the Medical Superintendent at Queen Elizabeth II
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Medical Hospital, a former liaison of the World Bank in the Ministry of Health, now at
UNFPA, Lesotho, the former Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of South Africa and
former vice president and secretary o f the World Bank Group now Minister of Finance
and Economic Planning and the current liaison to the World Bank in Maseru, Lesotho. In
what follows, I have summarized the answers provided by these people to the questions
previously noted on pages 51-52.
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1. Are you aware o f any projects or policies implemented by the World Bank to improve
the health sector over the last ten years?
The general consensus with regards to this specific question was that there have been
several policies implemented by the Bank in conjunction with the government of
Lesotho. The most prominent project noted was the fore mentioned Health Sector Reform
Program, also mentioned was the Second Population, Health and Nutrition Project
implemented as part of the 1995 Poverty Assessment and recently completed in 1998. On
a minor level, it was noted that Adaptable Project Loans (APL’s), funded by the Bank
were also implemented.

2. O f the policies mentioned, what was the most prominent project/ policy over this
period?
All those interviewed with regards to this question named the on-going Health Sector
Reform Project as the most prominent policy over the last decade. Differences were noted
with regards to the most prominent aspect of the Health Sector Reform Project. As ‘part
and parcel’ of this project, the development of the referral health system was cited as a
great achievement, while the focus on capacity building (namely through training and
other such workshops) was also noted as being a success.

3. Are you aware that discussions between the government o f Lesotho and the World
Bank led to the formulation ofpolicy designed, in part to invest in the health sector in the
1995 PRP?
For various reasons, none of those interviewed were specifically involved with the
implementation of the 1995 PRP. They did however have first hand knowledge of the
goings on of the Bank and the intricacies surrounding past and current developmental
projects. Those interviewed have only been in their respective positions for on average
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five years, so could therefore comment only on what they knew pertaining to the health
sector: although several of those interviewed attested to the implementation of the 1994
CAS, which was used as the basis for the 1995 PRP.

4. In your own opinion what has contributed to the challenges faced by the World Bank
(if in fact there were any) in implementing its projects/ policies?
The challenges faced by the Bank in implementing its policies in Lesotho according to
those interviewed are two-fold. Firstly that of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy in the
government, specifically the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare acts as a deterrent to
achieving prescribed goals. Along with this comes the notion of lack of leadership in the
government, coordination between government officials and those on the ground is non
existent, to the point where the real issues that need to be tackled are being over looked.
This bureaucratic inefficiency leads to a lack of accountability; accountability in
all aspects but especially with regards to personnel, specifically in retaining qualified
personnel to staff the health sector. Doctors and nurses are more mobile and almost
always leave Lesotho for greener pastures123 in South Africa, to places like Bloemfontein,
Johannesburg and Cape Town; this in turn leads to the hiring of foreign doctors.
These foreign doctors and nurses originate predominantly from Cuba, China and
the Democratic Republic of Congo, although other doctors and nurses can be found from
all across Africa. The Chinese doctors that come to work at QEII hospital are part of a
bilateral govemment-govemment agreement between the two respective governments. It
was also noted that there has historically been a distinct lack of resources in the health
sector; an example given was that at QE II hospital (the biggest and most resourceful of

123 By greener pastures, what is meant is that medical jobs in South Africa provide greater job security and
more competitive wages.
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the hospitals in Lesotho) there are no facilities/ instruments for radiotherapy, there is no
oncologist and there is often a lack of hot steam.124 In fact steam truly represents the
plethora of issues surrounding the lack of fundamental resources at the hospital: in
medical terms steam in necessary for sterilization and is subsequently used in autoclaves.
The steam is generated by boilers, which are powered by diesel. Therefore no steam in
actuality means that there is no diesel to fuel the boilers. The fact that the diesel was
allowed to get that low can be attributed to the gauges that discern levels of diesel, they
are broken and have not functioned for a substantially long time: an overall lack of
resources.

5. And how do you think you can correct these problems?
The most forthcoming answer to this question was that the entire system, from top to
bottom needs a complete overhaul. A complete systems overhaul, it was hoped would
lead to greater transparency in the bureaucratic process and in doing so the systems of
primary health care would be upheld, i.e. supervisory and support mechanisms and
established guidelines would be pushed to the forefront and sustained.
With regards to personnel, there is no adequate system of retention. It was
suggested that instead of spending tax payer’s money on foreign doctors (foreign doctors
are given an allowance and free accommodation) more local doctors and nurses need to
be trained. Once they have been trained, local packages for them can be increased; this
could potentially act as an incentive to make them stay in Lesotho as opposed to crossing
the border into South Africa, thus halting the significant ‘medical brain drain.’ Part of
these packages could include good quality government housing (which is scarce to non

124 Hot steam as it relates to medical surgery, no steam means no surgery can be performed.
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existent), especially in the more rural, mountainous areas of Lesotho i.e. Mohales Hoek,
Qacha’s Nek and Quthing.

6. Have the indicators o f ‘well-being’ i.e. life expectancy, child mortality, improved,
decreased or stayed the same over the last ten years?
The general view was that indicators of ‘well-being’ have decreased over the last few
years, (although no conclusive statistics were given). With the primary reason given was
that the HIV/ Aids pandemic has gripped Lesotho over the last decade. To verify this,
research showed that for example the average life expectancy in Lesotho has steadily
declined from 2000. In the year 2000, life expectancy was 50.79 years, 2001 48.84 years,
2002 47 years and 2003 36.94 years.125 Child mortality at birth has also increased: 2002
82.57 deaths per 1,000 live births, 2004 85.22 deaths per 1,000 live births.126

7. What is the average life expectancy in Lesotho?
None of those interviewed knew off-hand what the average life expectancy in Lesotho
was. I was referred to World Bank and other such sources to find out the average life
expectancy. However assumptions were made that life expectancy was between 40 - 45
years. According the CIA World fact-book, the average life expectancy for the total
Basotho population is 36.81 years,
females.

197

with an equal 36.81 breakdown between males and

Statistics regarding the discrepancy between life expectancy in rural areas

versus life expectancy in urban areas were unavailable.

125 Index Mundi. “Lesotho life expectancy at birth chart.” Sept 28 2004. Online. Available from
http ://www. indexmundi .com/g/g.aspx? c=lt&v=3 0
126 CIA: The World Fact Book, “Lesotho.” Sept 28 2004. Online. Available from
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/lt.html
127 It should be noted that 36.81 years is a decline from the 36.94 average life expectancy in 2003.
128 CIA World Fact Book. Sept 28 2004. Online. Available from
http://www.indexmundi.com/lesotho/life_expectancy_at_birth.html
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8. What is the leading cause o f death for adults in Lesotho?
When discussing the leading cause of death for adults in Lesotho, those interviewed drew
my attention to the fact that the health environment in Lesotho was characterized by a
combination of high fertility and high mortality, a preponderance of infectious diseases,
as well as both forms of malnutrition, chronic and acute.
This said, without a doubt the leading cause of death for adults in Lesotho was
given as HIV/ Aids. It was noted that over the last decade or so HIV and other Aids
related deaths are responsible for approximately 30% of deaths in Lesotho. The main
reason given for continuing upsurge in Aids related deaths was that the mentality of the
general populace makes the spread of HIV much easier; it was noted that the majority of
the population in Lesotho are “stuck” in their traditional ways, and for example disregard
the whole notion of sexual contraceptives. Although not the leading cause of death, it was
noted that there has been an increase in tuberculosis related deaths.

9. Is there a good working relationship between those implementing the desired goals
(i.e. doctors) and the administrators (i.e. government)?
The answer to this question was simply no; there is no working relationship between
those implementing the desired goals and the administrators. The entire relationship was
noted as being very laborious and bureaucratic. Those interviewed noted that health
professionals i.e. doctors are not involved enough in the decision making process, the
system therefore has become highly centralized and too operational, leading again to a
lack of accountability. Mechanisms of evaluation within the Lesotho government are
inadequate to non-existent.
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The medical superintendent gave as an example that she can not dismiss the
hospital janitor for incompetence. She would have to “get permission” from those above
her in the Ministry: conditions were described as being highly centralized with senior
authorities in the Ministry seeking complete control. To clarify this notion of
centralization, the medical superintendent gave another example regarding the foreign
doctors that are working at QE II hospital. She noted that as medical superintendent she
does not know the number of Cuban doctors working at the hospital, she is privy to this
information, whereas she was certain the Ministry knew. This highly centralized system;
it was felt undermines the authority and role of the medical superintendent.
10. Do health professionals have any input into projects that may be planned by the
government in consultation with the World Bank, or is it merely imposedfrom above?
With regards to input into projects/ policies it was by and large assumed that there was
some sort of consultation with the health professionals and the government (in this case
the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, especially with regards to coordination and
implementation. The question that was posed back was is the amount of consultation
adequate enough? It was noted that there is consultation to a certain extent: for example
with regards to the referral clinics,129 it is assumed that the health professionals who have
a stake in the implementation of the clinics would be consulted in any policy or project
decisions.
Others interviewed noted that there is consultation, but primarily between the
Director General (D.G) and the Ministry.130 This effect, according to those interviewed
leads to an under-representation of the rest of the health professionals in the consultation
129 Referral clinics and filter clinics are the same type o f clinic, the only difference being the terminology
used to describe them.
130 The D.G Dr. Ramathlapheng was unavailable for comment during the time that was spent in Lesotho, as
he was out o f the country.
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process. Since, historically the health professionals have been under-represented, it was
suggested that the D.G and the Ministry endeavour to involve nurses and doctors (i.e.
those on the ground) in the consultation process.
This top-down, centralized approach according to those interviewed does not
stimulate integration. The whole system was described as a type of Tine-ministry,’ in
which the World Bank deals with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, from the
which point the Ministry deals with the D.G, and then the D.G. informs the rest of the
health professionals what the particular objectives are. Therefore, while there is a degree
of consultation between the Ministry and the health professionals, the general consensus
was that the levels of consultation were inadequate.
The last group of questions were designed to specifically determine whether the
World Bank has been effective in fulfilling its stated health care developmental
objectives as outlined in the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan. Again, it should be
stated that by effective, one refers to the previously mentioned definition of effectiveness
as strengthening the long term ability o f human resources: that is, the extent to which the
health care system has evolved and is relatively free of social and economic restraints.

11. Are children underfive exempt from health fees?
The straightforward answer to this question was no, children in contemporary Lesotho
are not entirely exempt from paying health fees. It was noted that children have to pay
M5 (5 Maloti)131 per weeks hospital services, i.e. as long as the necessary referrals are
done within a one week period, the children are covered, however once one week has
passed, children have to pay an additional M5 for any other hospital services.

131 1USS = 6 Maloti.
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Is there free basic health coverage in Lesotho?
Along the same lines, those interviewed concurred that there is no free basic health
coverage in Lesotho. While children have to pay M5, adults are required to pay M10 per
week’s hospital services, with the same conditions attached with regards to referrals and
other such services.

12. If the answer is no: in your opinion is free health coverage a realistic goal/if the
answer is yes: how has this been successfully implemented?
It was determined that idealistically it would be nice to hope for free health coverage.
Those interviewed pointed to the fact that some of the worlds most developed countries
do not have a system whereby health coverage is entirely free, so essentially it is almost
asking too much for Lesotho (one of the poorer countries in the world) to have this free
health coverage as part of its social security system.
Realistically it was felt that the health system that is in place, although not perfect
by any means is the closest to “free health coverage” that Lesotho has come to since
independence, and hopefully there is room for improvement in the near future.

13. Is there geographic equity in hospitals/ clinics throughout Lesotho?
This question was answered on two levels. On one hand it was noted that there has been
an increase clinics/ hospitals from the stand point of mere infrastructure. At the top of this
list was the implementation of ‘filter clinics’ that have been built across Lesotho over the
last decade. According to those interviewed, filter clinics serve to upgrade the level of
existing health centres, making them more capable of technical procedures. There are
currently three in Lesotho, with the one in Maputsoe being open 24 hours a day.
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On the other hand those interviewed acknowledged that mere infrastructure does
not mean the quality of the health care has improved. Indeed it was noted that as
geographic equity has increased, the rural areas have been less served, in the sense that
there is no staff to serve in the remote outposts throughout Lesotho. This lack of
personnel can again be attributed to the ‘medical brain drain,’ that is, the majority of
nurses and doctors seeking greener pastures in South Africa. The health professionals
interviewed also mentioned that rural clinics often become dilapidated due to lack of
maintenance: a prime reason given for this problem was that the maintenance aspect of
the clinics is often out-sourced to non-profit organizations and not directly to the
ministry.
Essentially there has been an increase in geographic equity since the
implementation of the 1995 PRP: but according to the definition of effectiveness132 this
increase in geographic equity has not strengthened the long term ability of human
resources. While the health care system has been improved from an infrastructural stand
point, it has not developed the capacity to sustain long term human resources which is
essential for the health care sector in Lesotho.

14. Do local clinics retain the income that they receive?
No, local clinics in general do not retain the income that they receive. It was noted that
even if they do, the percentage would be very low around approximately 5-6% of
recurrent costs. Local government collects the funds and subsequently makes decisions
on expenditure. It was determined that funds received are consolidated and collected as
revenue for the government: the funds are then dispersed regionally in a manner seen fit
132 Strengthening the long term ability o f human resources: that is, the extent to which the health care
system has been improved over a p erio d o f time.
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by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. However it was also noted that, the
fact that the government collects the revenue, does not affect the general allocation of the
funds, which is handled locally.
Another tenable reason for why local clinics do not retain the income that they
receive was given by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning. It was noted that if
the clinics did retain the income that they received, this would greatly diminish certain
aspects of control and accountability. For example, if funds went missing nobody in
government would be accountable for them: local retention would reduce transparency,
given the structure o f the current administrative system.
While the responses to the questions are not the ‘holy grail’ to World Bank
effectiveness in Lesotho, they do paint a picture of how the 1995 PRP has been effective/
ineffective. The next chapter, taking the interviews into consideration, will discuss in
correlation with the research questions posed, the results previously outlined in this
section with regards to the 1995 PRP. For clarity’s sake the research questions posed are
the following: has the Bank been effective in fulfilling its stated health care
developmental objectives as outlined in the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan? If so,
how has it been effective? If not, what can be done to make it more effective? Lastly,
how does the Bank recognise the importance of local developmental goals?
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VI. DISCUSSION
Using information gathered from independent academics, World Bank documentation
and from interviews conducted in Lesotho, this chapter will attend to several issues. It
will firstly discuss the goals of the 1995 PRP against the stated hypotheses. Secondly this
chapter will discuss important assumptions with regards to external factors that may have
played a role in determining the effectiveness of the PRP. If it is determined that the PRP
was ineffective, the notions of coordination and implementation will be analysed to show
how increased coordination and better implementation might have improved the overall
effectiveness of foreign aid. Lastly, this chapter will suggest alternative methods to
enhance the overall effectiveness of the Bank’s policy implementation.
Poverty reduction as part of prescribed ‘developmental packages’ has evolved. No
longer is poverty reduction one dimensional, now poverty alleviation (through
development) stresses amongst other things education, economic growth and overall
‘good health.’ While poverty reduction in itself embodies a clear goal, it should be
realised that in actuality there is no precise road to perfect aid effectiveness. However
there are potential solutions to poverty reduction and this is precisely what the 1995 PRP
aimed to be, a latent solution to the multi-dimensional aspects of poverty in Lesotho. The
goal of assessing the effectiveness of the World Bank in Lesotho is ideally meant to
provide feedback to improve the future projects and policies of the Bank in Lesotho.
Before delving into the discussion surrounding the 1995 PRP, it is important to
again briefly define and highlight themes that have been prominent throughout this paper.
The main hypothesis of this paper asks the question: has the World Bank been effective
in fulfilling its stated health care developmental objectives as outlined in the 1995
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Poverty Reduction Action Plan? Effectiveness in this context is being defined as
strengthening the long term ability o f human resources: that is, the extent to which the
health care system has evolved and is relatively free o f social and economic restraints.
Using this definition of effectiveness the first two goals of the 1995 PRP,
exempting children less than five from paying fees and introducing a free basic health
care system have largely been ineffective. The fact remains that there is no free health
coverage for anyone in Lesotho. As is the case not only in the majority of countries in
southern Africa but the majority of countries globally, everyone has to pay for medical
attention. Consider a country like the United States, the leading economy in the world
with a GDP of $ 37,800,133 yet even here children do not enjoy free medical care. In fact
it is only as recently as under President Clinton that the proposed Universal Health Care
bill was bom in an attempt to make health care a right of every American citizen.
As noted by those interviewed, for a ‘developing’ country like Lesotho the idea of
free health care as a means to poverty reduction is very idealistic and verges on being
unrealistic, at least in the foreseeable future. Lesotho does not have the economic and
social security framework to support and finance free health care. A free health care
system requires amongst other things a vibrant and constantly growing economy: policies
and programmes designed to attain better health have historically required a rapidly
growing industrial economy which goes hand in hand with a reasonably healthy
economy.
For example, between 1960 and 1980 when the United States made significant
progress in its health care system: these achievements “were bought at high public cost.

133 CIA: The World Fact Book. “United States.” Oct 11 2004. Online. Available from
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html
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Social welfare expenditures by all levels of government increased from $52 billion in
1960 to $428 billion in 1979.”134 Lesotho is not a fully industrialized economy and its
economy is far from able to afford such staggering costs, particularly in the contemporary
economic climate.
Lesotho does not have free health coverage: but to a certain extent what it does
have is ‘affordable’ health coverage. This ‘affordable’ health coverage was not an
initiative of the World Bank. It sort of materialized by default. The notion of affordable is
also relative: it is not to say that every person in Lesotho can afford the M5 and M10 fees
imposed by the hospitals, but it is attainable, with the average wage in Lesotho is
approximately US$500135 per year which is about M3000 per year.
Yes strengthening the long term ability of human resources is an effective means
of reducing poverty, but what is paramount is that it should be realistically attainable. The
goal of increasing geographic equity i.e. decentralizing the health system is very
attainable: and of the four goals prescribed by the 1995 PRP this was the most realistic.
There has been an increase in the geographic distribution of health centres throughout
Lesotho, the rural mountainous areas are greater served than they were a decade ago.
In spite of this, the interviews showed that although there has been increased
geographic equity, this increase has been attained at a cost. This cost is a lack of
sustainability in terms of maintenance of basic medical standards and a lack of personnel
to staff the various clinics. As noted in the literature review, where the Bank is central to
the reform process, the sustainability of this reform is highly questionable. Even if it has

134 S.E. Berki, “Health Care Policy: Lessons from the Past and Issues o f the Future.” Annals o f the
American Academy o f Political and Social Science. (1983): 233.
135 Light for Lesotho Appeal. Oct 11 2004. Online. Available from
http://www.biblesocietv.ie/lightforlesotho.html

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

79

been proven that health centres “function well, when working in conjunction with referral
hospitals,”136 and that they “have the capacity to manage more than 90% of the health
care demands of developing countries,”137 the erosion of gains made does nothing to add
to the long term sustainability of the medical standards.
The construction of filter clinics has helped to take the pressure off the out-patient
department of Queen Elizabeth II hospital in Maseru. Out patient usage of the filter
clinics has increased substantially: for example “comparison of the average use for the
first 6 months after opening and the past 6 months shows a 78% increase in utilization of
the Qoaling filter clinic.”138 However current utilization levels nationwide are well below
what was expected for several reasons. It has been very difficult to encourage patients to
utilize filter clinics for primary health care: most patients prefer to be treated at Queen
Elizabeth II hospital, which has better facilities.
Granted the strengthening of the referral system has been given serious attention
within the package of services being defined in the PRP: and the infrastructure stands to
this day in places like Qoaling and Leribe to support this. The question is whether these
infrastructural successes that were achieved over the last ten years can be sustained
domestically. As already noted there is a strong presence of foreign doctors in Lesotho,
and there continues to be a strong reliance on non-Basotho doctors and medical staff for
the management and implementation of crucial medical programmes (most notably the
HIV/ AIDS programme and the TB inoculation programme).139

Ministry o f Health and Social Welfare, 18.
137 Ministry o f Health and Social Welfare, 18.
138 World Bank, Implementation Completion Report. Lesotho #18507. (Washington. World Bank, 1998), 4.
139 World Bank, Implementation Completion Report. Lesotho #18507. (Washington. World Bank, 1998), ii.
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The question of sustainability can be related to levels of institutional development
and analysis which are crucial when examining aid effectiveness. Sustainable health
improvements require strong institutional capacity and analysis. The Operations
Evaluation Department (OED) has critically noted some shortcomings in the Banks
approach to health sector reform: “slowness to incorporate good institutional analysis into
reform design” 140 and slowness to better quality of service delivery were both noted as
areas where the Bank could improve. The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare as an
institution is very weak, the centralization of this department as noted in the interviews
makes it very ‘top-down’ which leads communication and coordination problems, and
apart from the Lesotho Council of NGO’s there is no strong public organization to
buttress reform projects.
The top down approach to management is generally centred on the centralization
of decision-making. In contrast the ‘bottom up’ approach tends to more effective at
promoting self-sufficiency because it empowers those put in the position to make
decisions, it is inclusive in nature and does not leave anybody constrained or
‘handicapped’ as the ‘top down’ approach tends to do. For the sake of sustainability, the
‘bottom up’ approach is considerably more effective at promoting locally based problem
solving techniques which are crucial for success.
Without good institutional capacity, it becomes very difficult to sustain reform.
Lack of sustainability inevitably stifles the social and economic growth of the health care
sector, creating an entity whose framework is considerably flawed. Since 1966, the
Department of Social Welfare (responsible for ensuring that preventative and
rehabilitative welfare services are made available on an equal basis to all those in need)
140 Rogers, 50.
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has never had a ‘permanent home.’ Initially the department was housed in the Ministry of
Health, and then moved to the Ministry of Interior, then the Ministry of Justice and then
back to the Ministry o f Health.141 Naturally, this movement from ministry to ministry has
taken away the ability for the ministry to become a stable, coherent and meaningful unit.
This is an external factor that may have contributed to the lack of institutional capacity in
Lesotho, therefore limiting the effect of the geographic equity aspect of the 1995 PRP.
Other such external factors are discussed later on in this chapter.
The strategy of allowing local facilities to retain certain fees: if implemented
correctly, would definitely ‘strengthen the long term ability of the health care system’
economically and socially. By all intents and purposes this goal would promote
indigenous ownership and institutional development through local government assuming
a domestic responsibility for their health care facilities: simultaneously improving
efficiency of local health delivery.
However this goal has been far from effective. The aspiration has been
ineffective on two levels: the current Minister of Finance noted that if clinics did retain
the income that they received, this would greatly diminish certain aspects of control and
accountability. Again this calls into question coordination and communication, surely the
original purpose o f the goal was communicated between the three parties involved (the
Bank, the ministry and local government). Secondly, through the use of indigenous
resources it was determined that this practice of retaining local fees was not necessarily
created to promote efficiency but rather to serve primarily as an accounting

141 Ministry o f Health and Social Welfare, 66.
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mechanism,142 again a discrepancy that could have been resolved with the greater
communication.
So where the idea was for these local facilities to recover 15% of recurrent costs,
they only recover (if anything) between 5-6% of these costs. The World Bank
Implementation report notes that although the “stated objective was to improve the
efficiency of service delivery, mechanisms envisioned to achieve efficiency
improvements were never clearly defined.”143 With regard to the allocation of funds that
are recovered, the impact of the fees on the patients is hard to determine because
domestically, there exists no mechanism to measure this effect.
For the greatest gains in aid effectiveness, poverty reduction in all countries
should be initiated domestically. Domestic success requires fiscal responsibility on ‘all
fronts.’ This paper is not questioning or criticising the function of the Ministry of Finance
with regards to the health sector, although it should be noted that the ministry is
responsible for the allocation of funds regionally. Cause and effect, regional allocation of
funds in essence determines effectiveness of funds. Since this task is undertaken by the
ministry: whether the Bank has been effective in fulfilling its stated health care
developmental objective (allowing local facilities to retain certain fees) as outlined in the
1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan is determined by this fiscal policy.
Another factor influencing the effectiveness of this policy is that the “financial
management staff, are Ministry of Finance cadre which affects their commitment to the
objectives of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare:”144 again, lack of coordination
between the respective ministries. The whole problem is interrelated; there is a lack of
142 World Bank, 5.
143 World Bank, Implementation Completion Report. Lesotho #18507. (Washington. World Bank, 1998), 4.
144 World Bank, Implementation Completion Report. Lesotho #18507. (Washington. World Bank, 1998), 4.
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coordination between ministries and a lack of commitment to sound leadership within the
MOHSW. It can be argued that the leadership displayed by the MOHSW (health
professionals feel that there is a lack of consultation when it comes to project
implementation) is indirectly affecting the lack of coordination between the two
ministries in question, vis-a-vis improvements in the financial management area.
One of the recurring themes throughout this chapter is that the prevailing socio
economic conditions in Lesotho have indirectly affected effectiveness of the 1995 PRP.
Whether it is the evolution of specific ministries (hampering institutional capacity) or
domestic fiscal policy, these external factors have played a significant part in the Bank’s
general policy failure.
Sub-Saharan Africa unlike any other region in the world has consistently been the
poorest and most under-developed region in the world. Between 1965 and 1999 SubSaharan Africa saw no increase in per capita incomes,145 and like Lesotho, Sub-Saharan
Africa’s socio-economic situation has been affected by external factors. Non-oil
exporters in Africa (Lesotho being one of them lost a significant amount (cumulative
120%) of their GDP between 1965 and 1997 as a result of oil price fluctuations in the
global market.146 This fact merely serves to illustrate how on a macro-level, external
factors contribute to overall policy success or failure.
Some of the external factors that will be mentioned have been briefly touched on;
others fall into place through a sort o f ‘domino’ effect, highlighting the connections
between these factors. As previously mentioned Lesotho’s political climate has been
marred by instability: since independence there have been several coup attempts and the

145 Rogers, 21.
146 Rogers, 21.
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1990’s brought even more instability. What was generally viewed as a one sided political
election in 1998 led to increased “conflict over the allocation of political power.”147 So
disruptive and chaotic was this conflict that South Africa and other members of the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) had to send troops to quell riots in
September of 1998.
This political upheaval came at a time when the 1995 PRP was being
implemented: therefore any potential gains made in the health sector prior to this could
have significantly been reduced by this event. The “political upheaval gave rise to certain
political economic structures that influenced the functioning of civil service and the
MOHSW.”148 There exists no concrete measurement to determine if this naturally was
the case, however one should be aware of the effect of an incident of this magnitude. This
fact strengthens the argument made by critics who argue that political climate affects aid
effectiveness.
Basic economic theory suggests that improved socio-economic growth creates a
more conducive atmosphere for aid effectiveness. Implementation of policy is affected by
levels o f what the Bank refers to as the ‘pillars of development;’ creating a good
investment climate and empowering and investing in the people.149 These two ‘pillars’
are considered necessary for socio-economic growth: Lesotho is therefore at a
disadvantage when it comes to the ‘evolution’ of the health care system because it has not
experienced such growth, again diminishing and possibly constraining the 1995 PRP.
Socio-economic growth can be hampered by among other things major epidemics
or natural disasters. In the case of Lesotho, during the period in question there were two
147 Hassan, 1.
148 World Bank, 6.
149 Rogers, 26.
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major droughts in 1992 and 1998: the latter drought causing severe instances of
malnutrition, typhoid and diarrhoea particularly among children and the elderly. Again
this is an external factor that perhaps adversely affected the effectiveness of the 1995
PRP.
Other external factors although not as significant as those already mentioned do
play a part in determining the extent to which the health care system has evolved and is
relatively free of social and economic restraints. Constant population growth rate and
having strong political commitment at all levels; in this context has some bearing on aid
effectiveness. The Bank cites Lesotho’s population growth rate at 1.0% annually,150 even
with 1.0% growth in a country like Lesotho (with limited resources), this can put a
sizeable strain on local facilities, particularly health facilities. For comparative purposes a
1.0% annual increase in a country like Malawi would not have the same constraining
effect on local resources, primarily because Malawi’s institutions can absorb the costs
and effects of this population increase, whereas, unfortunately Lesotho’s institutions can
not.
Having a strong political commitment at all levels of government and society is
another external factor that could adversely affect aid effectiveness. Where noted scholars
(Michelle Adams, Halsey Rogers and David Dollar) point to the need for beneficiaries to
be involved in project implementation: without strong political commitment this process
is severely hampered. Tony Killick’s definition of government ownership, mentioned
earlier in the literature review comes to mind when discussing the notion of strong
political commitment:
150 World Bank. “Lesotho Data and Statistics.” Oct 12 2004. Online. Available from
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/LESQTHOEXTN/
0„menuPK:356055~pagePK: 141132~piPK: 141109~theSitePK:356029,00.html
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Government ownership is at its strongest when the political leadership and its advisers,
with broad support among agencies o f state and civil society, decide o f their own volition
that policy changes are desirable, choose what these changes should be and when they
should be introduced, and where these changes become built into parameters o f policy
and administration which are generally accepted as desirable.151

Project ownership in this context is the best way to gauge political commitment
because successful ownership involves all the leading actors in society (political leaders,
state agencies, civil society and working professionals): and domestic policies initiated by
these leading actors do have a pervasive influence on the whole system of foreign aid.
The 1995 Poverty Reduction Plan was unsuccessful in implementing its stated
goals. It is extremely difficult to assess blame or even credit to the World Bank, because
so many other factors came into play. Some gains were made, but these gains in
comparison to the goals set through the 1994 CAS were far below the expected outcome.
External factors may have eroded much of the gains made, but ultimately this paper
asserts that the 1995 PRP failed in part because of a lack of coordination between the
respective parties which led to unsatisfactory project implementation.
Coordination is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “bringing the
different elements of (a complex activity or organization) into an efficient
relationship.” 152 The key phrase in the forementioned definition is “efficient
relationship:” efficiency encompasses all the different elements (coordination,
cooperation and implementation) working towards a single goal. Whether it is
coordination between the Bank and the government or coordination between the
government and in this case health professionals, efficiency is crucial. In the field of
development, coordination or levels of coordination with regards to bilateral and

151 Tony Killick, Aid and the Political Economy o f Policy Change (New York: Routledge, 1998), 76.
152 Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 180.
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multilateral aid often single-handedly affect the immediate and long term effectiveness of
project specific aid.
Several examples of successful coordination between the World Bank and local
governments can be found over the last few years. In 1996, the Bank in partnership with
the Mexican government initiated the very successful ‘Progresa” project. This project
provided “immediate financial transfers to the rural poor while at the same time
promoting investment in children’s human capital via increased schooling and improved
health and nutrition status.”153
Similarly the Bank, using its good working relationship with the Bangladeshi
government has supported numerous projects over the last thirty years that has led to a
decrease in the infant mortality rate from approximately 140 deaths per 1000 live births
to 71 deaths per 1000 live births.154 Bangladesh is “the only one among the world’s 20
poorest countries to record a sustained reduction in birth rates over the past twenty
years.”155 This too is largely to do with the good relationship between the Bank and the
Bangladeshi government.
While there may be other reasons why the 1995 PRP was unsuccessful in
Lesotho, lack of coordination was clearly an issue. Those interviewed noted that in
Lesotho there has historically been a lack of coordination between the MOHSW and the
health professionals. So prevalent is this lack of coordination that those ‘on the ground’
view the MOHSW as a deterrent to achieving prescribed goals. The bureaucracy within
the ministry (strong lack of leadership) has undoubtedly contributed to this lack of

154 Rogers, 19.
154 Rogers, 18.
155 Rogers, 18.
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coordination. It was also noted that lack of coordination leads to a plethora of other
problems, the most significant being lack of accountability.
Another aspect of this lack of coordination can be found when looking at the
relationship that exists between ministries. The relationship between the ministries
highlights the problem of inadequate consultation, which is an indirect consequence of
poor coordination. For the goals of the 1995 PRP to be met effectively government wide
coordination was necessary: i.e. there needed to be cooperation between the MOHSW
and the Ministry of Finance, MOHSW and the Ministry of Planning. The Bank Project
Implementation Assessment notes that “the difficulty of achieving inter-ministerial and
inter-agency cooperation was underestimated in some instances.”156 Clearly the MOHSW
did not put sufficient energy into inter-ministerial cooperation, which again attests to the
lack of coordination.
The centralization of the administrative system (idea of a Tine-ministry’) has
made the system too top down and authoritative to the point that health professionals are
rarely consulted in matters where their opinion could potentially make a difference. For
example, had the Bank encouraged the MOHSW to consult health professionals then
maybe they would have been more actively involved in the consultation process: this
being the case, maybe the 1995 PRP would have paid greater attention to HIV and the
problems associated with HIV epidemic in Lesotho. Greater attention could have been
given to more cost-effective m ethods to tackle other more pressing problems affecting the

health climate i.e. the high rates of fertility and mortality and the chronic and acute
malnutrition problems.

156 World Bank, Implementation Completion Report. Lesotho #18507. (Washington. World Bank, 1998), 5.
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“Government interventions in Africa have so far become discredited, not because
there is an effective alternative in the form of an effective market mechanism but because
of inefficient management, poor results and misallocation of resources.” 157 Inefficient
management and misuse of resources brings us to project implementation. It has already
been established that there was a distinct lack of coordination particularly between the
MOHSW and the health professionals: lack of coordination seriously affects
implementation.
The degree of implementation has historically been affected by the non-lending
tools of development i.e. advice, capacity building and analysis. Implementation of
policy is normally solely handled by the respective ministry (in this case the MOHSW). It
was the responsibility of the MOHSW to ensure that the right analytical tools and advice
be made available with regards to the 1995 PRP; in this area they failed.
Indeed it was noted that “technical assistance was one of the largest areas of
underspending. This low disbursement is not unique to this project and is a more generic
problem that the MOHSW faces - the ministry actually underspends on its own budget,
and fails to implement many planned interventions.” 158 The idea of a ministry
underspending on its own budget clearly illustrates poor planning and poor financial
management. All o f which could have potentially been avoided had there been better
communication between the respective parties. The Bank should bear some responsibility
for this: as the organization that is funding the project, evaluation systems should have
been put in place that would have been able to notice and rectify the problem.

157 Benno J. Ndulu. “Governance and Economic Management.” Strategies for African Development
(Berkeley, University o f California Press. 1986), 102.
158 World Bank, Implementation Completion Report. Lesotho #18507. (Washington. World Bank, 1998), 6.
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Another example of poor implementation can be found in relation to the ‘filter
clinics.’ The construction of several filter clinics was significantly delayed due to the
failure of Bank officials to take into consideration the complex property laws of Lesotho.
This resulted in not only a significant delay in project implementation but also a rise in
construction costs.

159

The interviews stressed high staff turnover as a weakness of the current health
system: but this high staff turnover also indirectly affects project implementation. This
staff turnover in combination with poor leadership impacted negatively on the
sustainability o f the goals of the 1995 PRP. This consequently negated the capacity for
implementation, and therefore the objectives that were put in place could not be sustained
or properly implemented. “The high staff turnover also resulted in a lack of institutional
memory,”160 ‘institutional memory can be directly linked with the ‘brain drain,’ that is
staff who leave Lesotho to go to neighbouring South Africa for employment.
In the case of the 1995 PRP, there were clear fundamental problems with
coordination and implementation. Coordination and project implementation levels were
unsatisfactory to the point that they negated potential gains that the 1995 PRP could have
made. The question that needs to be answered here is to what extent is the World Bank
responsible for ensuring that levels of coordination and implementation are successfully
implemented by local governments?
The Bank as the foremost agent of development in southern Africa should be
responsible for ensuring that levels of coordination and implementation are successfully
implemented by local governments. Scholarly literature and the Bank’s own rhetoric

159 World Bank, 6.
160 World Bank, 6.
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glorify project ownership as the means for aid to be more effective. World Bank
evaluations carried out by the OED have highlighted “the importance of client and
beneficiary participation in the design and implementation of the project for achieving
satisfactory outcomes,” 161 and a literally perfect example of this (the Peru Roads Project
was given the World Bank’s President award for excellence) can be found in the Peru
rural roads project which is sighted as being a good example of “responsiveness to client
needs, cost-effectiveness and innovation.” 162 For this project to represent the ultimate
success, the Bank surely took the responsibility to accurately find out ‘client needs’ and
to facilitate cooperation with the Ministry of Transportation in Peru.
This said, following research in the field, it has been determined that a great deal
can be done to enhance the overall effectiveness of the Banks policy implementation in
Lesotho. First and foremost, it is imperative for the World Bank through its office located
in Maseru to establish an effective evaluation mechanism that is inclusive in nature.
Inclusive in the sense that not only should there be progress reports on field operations,
but these evaluations should monitor staff turnover and movement. In this way better
methods can be devised to ensure that there is some sort of staff retention, which in turn
contributes to project continuity. Far too often senior staff in the health sector leave, and
no one is immediately available to step in and carry out the required tasks, and this slows
down project implementation significantly. A further step could be taken to ensure future
project sustainability by focusing on nurturing local management specifically to support

Bank operations: ideally this could be done by the Bank in conjunction with the Ministry
of Health and Social Welfare.

161 Rogers, 55.
162 Rogers, 56.
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Staff retention was clearly one of the more contentious issues raised during the
interview process. Something needs to be done fairly quickly to slow down the medical
‘brain drain’ that is affecting Lesotho. What better way to promote ownership than
devising methods to retain staff? Not only does retaining staff strengthen the capacity for
ownership but it also goes a long way to ensuring project sustainability. Several methods
could be used to retain staff: a greater incentive package for starters. It would be in the
best interests for the MOHSW to focus on improving local staff packages in terms of
salaries and benefits, in this way hopefully the allure of neighbouring South Africa will
not be that great for medical staff. The idea of bringing in foreign doctors (at extremely
high salaries) does not make sense in terms of sustainability because eventually these
doctors leave, and their previously occupied positions remain empty.
Clearly decentralization is necessary for the MOHSW to become more effective.
Decentralization could lead to more effective management techniques, and would
hopefully lead to the creation of some sort of Health information management system,
which could provide accurate information and statistics to organizations like the World
Bank and other such donors. The current environment is one in which medical data is
often incomplete and inaccurate, primarily because of irregular data from institutions
within and outside government. Decentralization (for arguments sake) would also spread
risk and accountability, with no one organ of the MOHSW being responsible for every
aspect o f the M OH SW .

If the Bank is to be effective in future operations, greater awareness of the
problems on the ground need to be identified. This awareness is raised through greater
coordination between the MOHSW and the Bank. It is an understatement to say that there

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

93

needs to be greater cooperation between these two entities. Bureaucratic efficiency needs
to be improved; perhaps a thorough revamping of the MOHSW is necessary for this to be
achieved, but in some way or another everybody needs to be involved in the decision
making process, and in the socio-economic landscape of Lesotho, this can only be
achieved through greater consultation and cooperation.
Tony Killick says that domestic policies in the aid recipient countries of subSaharan Africa, though not the only factor, play the most important role in determining
aid effectiveness. The Bank needs to have a greater understanding of domestic policies
and issues (in the case of the 1995 PRP, health) to ensure maximum project effectiveness.
At the time of project formulation, Bank officials should have realised that Lesotho was
(and continues to be) in the midst of an HIV epidemic. As noted in the interviews HIV
and other HIV related deaths have been the leading causes of death in Lesotho over the
last decade: therefore more attention should perhaps have been given to preventative
measures or to strengthening the support mechanisms in order to deal with this epidemic.
Lesotho has one of the highest HIV prevalence rates in the world; combine this with the
migratory labour that has become a staple of the Lesotho economy163 and you have a
pandemic that spreads nation wide and even across the border into South Africa. It would
have strengthened the PRP to focus on the linkage between HIV and poverty. If the HIV
problem were somehow dealt with, life expectancy in Lesotho would increase from 36.81
years to approximately 47 years.

The question as to whether or not the Bank recognized the importance of local
development goals can be answered fairly simply. There were no concise local
developmental goals; the goals o f the 1995 PRP were prepared by the Bank in
l6;' Note, the gold widows.
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conjunction with the government, but ultimately whose interests were they representing?
From a theoretical perspective, an institution like the World Bank (although by definition
and entity representing sovereign states) is one of the “most formally institutionalized
features of the international economic regime” 164 and sometimes these “regimes may
assume a life of their own, a life independent of the basic casual factors that led to their
creation in the first place.”165 Theoretically if this were to occur the Bank would not
always represent client states to the best of its ability.
As a matter o f fact, the Bank, under the guise of poverty reduction has had a
history of prescribing homogenous solutions to perceived problems. At the macro level
(with the goal being economic growth/ poverty reduction) the Bank has in the past
implemented structural adjustment programmes across the African continent, some
succeeded (Uganda and Botswana for example) whereas others failed drastically
(Nigeria). It is not the intention of this paper to go into specific details as to why these
structural adjustment programmes failed, but simply to draw attention to the fact that
local developmental goals are not always taken into consideration when it comes to
poverty reduction.
The Bank, in the case of Lesotho cannot be held totally responsible for not
realizing the importance of local developmental goals. The Bank was not made aware of
these local developmental goals; yes the Bank, through its own credence could have done
more to becom e a w a re of what goals needed to be met, but this was essentially the

responsibility of the government o f Lesotho.

164 William Ascher, “N ew Development Approaches and the Adaptability o f International Agencies: the
Case o f the World Bank.” International Organization. (1983): 415.
165 Ascher. 415.
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As Luttik and White note, aid effectiveness is relative to time, place and situation.
While the 1995 PRP essentially failed in Lesotho, it may have been successful in every
other country on the African continent. The goal o f ‘investing in human resources’ at the
time may have seemed like the right way to improve the health sector, but at the end
different situations combined to make this task very difficult. When it comes to the health
sector, the record o f the World Bank is not enviable: as Meredith Turshen noted the
policies of organizations like the World Bank and IMF tend to cause a decline in the
health care systems o f developing countries. Although, there was not a decline in health
care standards, there was no visible improvement in the health care system.
Cassen believes that aid projects can help the poor, as long as governments and
donors are on the same page when it comes to implementation. What Cassen fails to
understand is that even though ‘poverty related projects’ may have a higher rate of return,
this rate of return is conditional to levels of coordination not only between governments
and donors, but within governments and between governments and civil society/
professionals. While all poverty related strategies do not require centralized government
planning, they do require as Milton Friedman put it an effective workforce in a favourable
economic situation.166 Taking nothing away from the hard working health professionals
in Lesotho, overall the medical cadre is ineffective.
Lastly, to go back to the hypothesis that provided the framework for this study:
has the Bank been effective in fulfilling its stated health care developmental objectives as
outlined in the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan? No, the Bank has not been

166 Milton Friedman, “Foreign Economic Aid: means and objectives” reprinted in Jagdish Bhagwati and
Richard Eckaus, (1970): 64.
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effective: there was a lack o f coordination on all fronts which subsequently led to flawed
implementation.
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VII. CONCLUSION

The principle remit of this paper was to discuss the reasons why the World Bank led 1995
PRP failed to reach its stated objectives. The Bank was chosen as the main area of focus
because the Bank at the time was, and continues to be the foremost agent of development
globally. Lesotho was chosen as the case study primarily because there are not enough
studies that have focused on this little country in southern Africa. Lesotho also presented
an opportunity to physically go out into the field and conduct first hand research on the
Bank’s activities in this country.
The methodology was designed to maximise the validity of the information that
was needed. Indigenous resources contributed invaluably to the success of this paper, and
interviews conducted with health professionals and government officials proved to be
extremely useful in this context. For these same reasons the results of this paper can not
be generalized. The results of this paper are applicable only to Lesotho for various
reasons: not only were the socio-economic conditions unique to Lesotho, the literature
review also showed that the definition of effectiveness is relative, and can be defined in
numerous ways. In the context o f this study it was felt that effectiveness was best defined
as ‘strengthening the long term ability of human resources: that is, the extent to which the
health care system has evolved and is relatively free of social and economic restraints.’
Since the focus of this paper was on the World Banks effectiveness in upgrading
the health care system , this paper began by laying out a theoretical and analytical

framework for aid effectiveness to be examined. This provided a context in which the
results of the 1995 PRP could be related to, with regards to how successful or
unsuccessful this policy was. The literature review, a combination of Bank literature with
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other independent academics established: (a) conditions that are conducive to aid
effectiveness (ownership, good policy environment in the recipient nation and
institutional capacity; (b) introduced the idea o f coordination as essential to aid
effectiveness; and (c) that domestic policy is essential to the whole system of aid
effectiveness.
Overall, health sector performance or health care indices are a solid means of
judging among other things whether or not poverty reduction policies have been
effective. Health indices are measurable and thus are normally used in quantitative
studies, so the 1995 PRP provided a means to initiate a qualitative study, to view the
project through different lenses: lenses that seek to include the people who participate
(health professionals) and receive their points of view.
To put the health reforms sought by the Bank into context, an overview of the
health sector was introduced. The reforms initiated by the Ministry of Health and Social
Welfare were chronologically listed leading up to the 1994 Country Assessment Strategy
carried out by the World Bank, which later became the blueprint for the 1995 PRP. The
1995 PRP set the following goals in health care: (a) exempt children less than five from
fees; (b) introduce a free basic health care system; (c) increase geographic equity; and (d)
allow local facilities to retain fees.
Granted in every case study one always feels that perhaps more people could have
been interviewed or consulted for their input. Perhaps if more people had been

interviewed the results of the interviews would not have been so conclusive and
conceivably other pertinent issues may have been raised. With the advantage of
hindsight, it is safe to say that those interviewed truly represented the general views of
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their specific industries. The Medical Superintendent of Queen Elizabeth II Hospital in
essence was the voice of all the doctors and nurses working around Lesotho, while those
with World Bank experience offered opinions based on their combined experience as
World Bank agents in Lesotho. The Director of Health Planning in the Ministry of Health
and Social Welfare again was able to call on her experiences within the ministry to
provide other specifics with regards to policy coordination: while the Minister of Finance
gave invaluable clarity to the economics of the health system.
Due to time and other such restraints, the questions used in the interviews were
again designed to maximise validity and to be as concise as possible. The majority of the
questions (especially when it came to the effectiveness of the 1995 PRP goals) were yes/
no questions: but these yes/ no answers required validation: and this is where the real
information was gathered. Where questions could not be answered (for lack of statistics)
these statistics were readily available from the World Bank or other such reputable online
sources.
Turning to the results o f the interviews themselves: the results of the interviews
made two things apparent. Firstly that the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare is
providing inadequate leadership and this translates itself in the relationship that the
ministry has with the health professionals. There is a distinct lack of consultation and
coordination between these two entities which creates an unhealthy working
environment, particularly for p olicy form ulation w hich has an adverse effect on aid

effectiveness. The Bank should have also done more to facilitate greater coordination and
understanding between itself and the other respective entities.
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Secondly, project implementation was flawed, partly because of this lack of
coordination, but also due to the inability of the Bank to understand the structure or
inconsistencies of the MOHSW: at the time the MOHSW was (and continues to be)
highly centralized. The Bank ideally should have put itself in a position to clearly identify
and work to improve these flaws that affected its service delivery. Ultimately the 1995
PRP was not a victim of a ‘bad idea’ but of poor coordination and implementation. Like
the literature on aid effectiveness suggests: effective aid is aid that is well allocated and
well implemented (taking into consideration ownership, domestic policies and
institutional capacity). In this context, Bank funds (US $12.1 million) were well allocated
but were not well implemented.
One should be cautious about ‘over-generalizing’ the evidence that has been
presented in this paper. While this paper focuses on Lesotho, one feels that the theoretical
lessons learned or theoretical conclusions made from this study, to a certain extent help
provide insight to the ‘bigger problem/ picture’ in international relations. This paper is
ultimately about the 1995 PRP and what can be learnt from the failure of this policy.
Studies on aid effectiveness demand a considerable amount of head scratching when it
comes to offering conclusions because almost every study on aid effectiveness (Knack,
Holmgren, Killick and World Bank) is different, because they focus on different aspects.
One of the more important and personal reasons why this research was conducted
w as to contribute to the greater understanding of the Lesotho situation: if the results of

this study potentially contribute to understanding the plight of ‘poverty reduction’ in subSaharan Africa then something has been achieved. It is no secret that sub-Saharan Africa
is the poorest region of the world and Lesotho is one of the poorest nations in this region.
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Assumptions are plentiful as to the cause of this region being so ‘under-developed’ and
poor, but at the end of the day it’s still going to be a poor region, that is not going to
change unless solutions can be provided.
International financial institutions like the World Bank, although they do bare the
brunt of responsibility for failed projects in the region, are generally doing a
commendable job in fighting poverty. Not to say that there is no poverty, but progress is
being made: with a little ‘policy fine tuning’ Bank aid will hopefully be more effective in
the years to come. Aid and its effectiveness is a small part of the global battle to alleviate
poverty, different lenses can be used to view the same problem, and this paper is one of
many lenses that can be used to view poverty reduction efforts in Lesotho.
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